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RETROACTIVITY: A STUDY IN SUPREME 
COURT DOCTRINE "AS APPLIED" 
JOHN BERNARD CoRRt 
The judicial creation of a new rule of law raises the essential ques-
tion whether that rule is to be applied retroactively or prospectively only. 
The consistency of the traditional mandatory retroactivity rule has given 
way to a more flexible retroactivity analysis. The change occurred in 
1965 when the Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker squarely faced a 
rule that, tf applied retroactively, would have affected thousands of 
criminal convictions. The Linkletter doctrine has since defined the con-
tours of federal retroactivity analysis to include three basic considera-
tions: purpose of the rule in question, reliance by the parties on the rule, 
and effect of retroactive application on the administration ofjustice. An 
examination of Supreme Court decisions since 1975 and of lower fed-
eral court decisions since 1971 leads Professor Corr to challenge the 
utility of the retroactivity doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court; in 
short, the logical appeal of the purpose-reliance-effect triad does not 
transfer well into practical application. Given the confusion and incon-
sistencies currently present in the retroactivity analysis of lower federal 
courts, it is suggested that more usiful guidelines be developed in this 
complex area of the law. More importantly, it is also suggested that 
doctrinal development should take into account the practical problems 
of applying doctrine, and not merely such considerations as fairness or 
the abstract logical appeal of a doctrine. 
These questions [of retroactivity] are among the most difficult of 
those which have engaged the attention of [the] courts . . .. 
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, 19401 
Chief Justice Hughes could not have known that he lived in the good old 
days, when retroactivity was simple. Only in the last twenty years have we 
come to appreciate just how difficult retroactivity analysis can be. 
At first glance, retroactivity analysis seems quite straightforward. It is a 
process by which courts determine whether a new judge-made rule of law 
should be applied to events arising before the new law was promulgated. In 
order that those determinations be marked with some degree of fairness and 
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predictability, retroactivity analysis involves an attempt to develop rules or 
guidelines helpful to judges in their efforts to make just retroactivity decisions. 
Implicit in that effort is the prospect that in an appropriate circumstance a 
given decision will not have retroactive effect, but will apply only to cases or 
events arising after some particular date. Much of the difficulty in retroactiv-
ity analysis has arisen in the attempt to formulate workable rules or guidelines 
for determining when a decision will be held wholly or partially prospective. 
Matters were not always so difficult. Indeed, prospectivity was alien to 
the common law, which simply assumed that new decisions would be applied 
retroactively.2 Early American writers tended to treat displaced law as though 
it had never been the law.3 In fact, this view is implicit in Marbury v. 
Madison,4 in which Chief Justice Marshall assumed that a decision of uncon-
stitutionality was simply a declaration of a preexisting state of affairs and ren-
dered the law a complete nullity. This assumption was consistent with the 
concept of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that judges are discoverers 
rather than makers oflaw; thus, the need for any form of retroactivity analysis 
did not become obvious until well into the twentieth century. Some awaken-
ing has occurred in the federal courts in fits and starts over the past fifty 
years,5 but it was not untill965, when the Supreme Court decided Linkletter v. 
Walker ,6 that retroactivity analysis truly came to the fore. 
Linkletter involved a petition for retroactive application of the earlier de-
cision of the Supreme Court inMapp v. Ohio,7 in which the exclusionary rule 
was applied to warrantless searches conducted by state officers in violation of 
the fourth amendment. To apply Mapp retroactively would have affected con-
victions in "thousands of cases"8 decided prior to Mapp, so in Linklelter the 
Supreme Court was forced to ponder whether in some circumstances it might 
be more appropriate to make a new rule partly or completely prospective in 
application. The Court concluded that the way to approach retroactivity was 
to "weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history 
of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective opera-
tion will further or retard its operation."9 The Court also considered the de-
gree to which parties had relied on the pre-Mapp standards and the 
2. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-27 (1965). 
3. See 2 J. WINTHROP, THE HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND FROM 1630 TO 1649, 289 (1826), 
. quoted in Flaherty, Law and the Enforcement of Morals in Early America, in AMERICAN LAW AND 
THE CoNSTITUTIONAL ORDER 53 (L. Friedman & H. Scheiber ed. 1978): 
[W]e have no laws diametrically opposite to those of England, for then they must be 
contrary to the law of God and of right reason, which the learned in those laws have 
anciently and still do hold forth as the fundamental basis of their laws, and that if any-
thing hath been otherwise established, it was an errour and not a law, being against the 
intent of the lawmakers. 
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
5. For a good discussion of cases and literature on retroactivity prior to the 1960s, see Levy, 
Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. Rev. I (1960). 
6. 381 u.s. 618 (1965). 
7. 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
8. 381 U.S. at 636. 
9. Id. at 629. 
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consequences retroactivity would have on the administration of justice. 10 Two 
years after Linkletter, in Stovall v. Denno, 11 the Supreme Court solidified those 
three elements-purpose, reliance, and effect-as a foundation upon which 
much (but not all) of the future retroactivity analysis of the Supreme Court 
would proceed. Stovall thereupon became an integral feature of what this ar-
ticle will term the "Linkletter I Stovall doctrine." Similarly, in Chevron Oil Co. 
v. Huson, 12 decided six years after Linkletter, the Supreme Court adopted a 
Linkletter-like doctrine for many civil cases subject to retroactivity analysis. 
Linkletter, therefore, had two important consequences. Its immediate effect 
was to make the rule of Mapp prospective; 13 its effect over time was to create a 
minor industry in which judges, practicing lawyers, and academics labored to 
establish just and predictable rules governing the applicability of law-chang-
ing cases. 14 
The surge of interest in retroactivity subsequent to Linkletter has never 
completely abated, but as the pace of Supreme Court proclamations on the 
subject has slowed, 15 theLinkletteriStovall doctrine has assumed the appear-
ance of greater definition and diminished malleability. It is, therefore, an op-
portune time to examine that doctrine and related analyses as they have 
matured-not so much for the quality of thought behind them, for that has 
been done many times, 16 but to determine the utility of Linkletter I Stovall and 
other approaches in trial and lower appellate courts, the arenas in which the 
day-to-day work of our judicial system is accomplished. No amount of doctri-
nal beauty, after all, can compensate for the disutility of a standard in applica-
tion, so an evaluation of the Linkletter I Stovall standard must consider how it 
works as well as how it looks. Toward that end, this article will summarize 
Supreme Court decisions involving retroactivity since 1975, the year in which 
a summary was last undertaken. 17 The cases are addressed in chronological 
order, largely so that we may see the development of retroactivity from the 
stance of the lower courts that are trying to implement the doctrine. The arti-
cle will then examine how well Supreme Court retroactivity doctrines actually 
10. /d. at 637-38. 
11. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). One student oftheLinkleller doctrine believes the purpose-reliance-
effect test was not clearly presented until Stovall. See Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A 
Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REv. 1557, 1566 (1975). 
12. 404 u.s. 97 (1971). 
13. 381 U.S. at 640. 
14. The efforts of the Supreme Court until 1975 are chronicled in Beytagh, supra note 11. 
For other useful scholarly discussions, see, e.g., Currier, Time and Change in Judge Made Law: 
Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965); Haddad, Retroactivity Should be Rethought: A 
Cal! for the End of the Linkleller Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE SCI. 417 
(1969); McNulty, Corporations and the Intertemporal Co'!flict of Laws, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 12 
(1967); Mishkin, Foreword· The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and 
Law, 19 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); Ostrager, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Supreme Court Con-
stitutional Interpretations, 19 N.Y.L. FoRUM 289 (1973); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability and 
Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 719 (1966); Traynor, Quo Vadis, 
Prospective 01•erruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 533 (1977). 
15. Since 1975 the Supreme Court has addressed a retroactivity issue in less than ten cases. 
16. See, e.g., the sources supra note 14. 
17. See Beytagh, supra note 11. 
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work in the lower courts, using as a data base an investigation of more than 
two hundred federal district and circuit court decisions published since the end 
of 197I.l8 By treating Supreme Court pronouncements as preliminary, and 
focusing closely upon the application of those pronouncements in the lower 
courts, we can explore not only the full depth of retroactivity doctrine, but also 
in a broader sense evaluate the role of the Supreme Court as lawmaker. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT 1975-1982 
Professor Beytagh's synthesis of Supreme Court decisions addressing the 
Linkletter/Stova/1 and Chevron retroactivity doctrines included cases decided 
as late as June 1975.19 Thereafter the rate with which retroactivity issues were 
brought before the Court dropped significantly. Decisions that have been 
made, however, provide important indications that within the Supreme Court 
the Linkletter/Stovall approach, at least, has lost momentum and is under 
pressure. The sources of that pressure are diverse; they include the creation of 
procedural requirements that restrict the use of Linkletter; the continued use of 
older retroactivity doctrines, the scope of which probably remains inviolate to 
both Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron expansion; and the articulation of pro-
posals thatLinkletter/Stovall should be entirely abandoned in determining the 
retroactivity of certain important categories of cases. 
The first retroactivity case20 to be decided after June 1975 helps demon-
18. Federal cases were used because the federal courts are peculiarly subject to the supervi-
sion of the Supreme Court. By contrast, state courts addressing state issues are under no obliga-
tion to use the retroactivity rules of the Supreme Court, Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 
287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932), and many states have developed their own approaches to retroactivity. 
See, e.g., Perrella & Golembiewski, Retroactivity of Cal!fornia Supreme Court Decisions: A Proce-
dural Step Toward Fairness, 17 CAL. W.L. REv. 403 (1981). 
Cases decided in the last decade are particularly useful because it was only in late 1971 that 
the Supreme Court clearly adopted aLink/eller/Stova/1-like retroactivity analysis for certain cate-
gories of civil litigation. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
19. Beytagh, supra note 11. 
20. Actually, the very first retroactivity question to be decided after June 1975 was outside 
the scope of standard retroactivity analysis entirely. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), 
arose in the wake of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller had altered the standard for 
separating obscenity from first amendment protected speech established earlier in Memoirs v. 
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The rules enunciated in Miller were, at one and the same 
time, beneficial and harmful to criminal defendants who might have anticipated the application of 
Memoirs to their cases. The Supreme Court had already decided that the benefits of Miller would 
be retroactively available to criminal defendants, Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 102 
(1974), and Marks resolved the question of the retroactivity of those portions of Miller harmful to 
defendants. That question was one of constitutional dimensions outside the scope of retroactivity 
analyses such as Linkleller, so the Court simply used Marks to restate the principle that under the 
fifth and fourteenth amendments changes in case law operating to the detriment of criminal de-
fendants could not be applied retroactively. 430 U.S. at 196. 
Interestingly, the conviction of Miller, the original defendant in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15 (1973}, was ultimately allowed to stand. After the Supreme Court announced its new rule in 
Miller and remanded the case to the state courts, the state appellate court affirmed the conviction 
again, this time with a nod from the Supreme Court. Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974) 
(appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question). The short time lag between remand 
and reaffirmation of the conviction suggests that Miller did not get a new trial, but only a review 
of his original conviction under the new rule of obscenity the Supreme Court announced on his 
first appeal. Assuming, as appears clearly to be the case, that the Supreme Court intended Miller 
to obtain the benefit of the new rule announced in his own case, the absence of a retrial raises a 
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strate the manner in whichLinkletter/Stovall has been subdued. Hankerson v. 
North Carolina21 addressed the retroactivity of Mullaney v. Wilbur,22 in which 
the Court had held that jury instructions which require a criminal defendant 
to carry a burden of proof as to any element of a crime violate due process. In 
Hankerson the jury had received such instructions, and defendant made a 
Mullaney objection for the first time when his case came before the North 
Carolina Supreme Court on direct review. That court concluded that the in-
structions in Hankerson would have been error under the rule of Mullaney, 
but that Mullaney had no retroactive effect because the impact upon the ad-
ministration of justice of releasing or retrying numerous convicted criminals 
would be devastating. 
The United States Supreme Court took a different approach to Hanker-
son. At first the Court seemed to reaffirm the established Li11kletter/Stovall 
approach to retroactivity. Citing primarily to Ivan V. v. City of New York ,23 a 
Linkletter offspring, Justice White's opinion for the Court restated the holding 
of several cases in the Linkletter line that when the primary purpose of a new 
rule is to enhance substantially the truth-finding function of criminal trials, 
neither reliance nor considerations of the impact of the rule upon the adminis-
tration of justice can justify only prospectivity. 24 
If that had been the end of Justice White's analysis, Hankerson would 
have been a routine reinforcement of standard Linkletter I Stovall doctrine. In 
a footnote, however, Justice White also sought to ease the apprehension of the 
lower court that retroactivity for Mullaney would produce a wholesale release 
of convicted criminals. It was "unlikely," Justice White commented, 
that prior to Mullaney many defense lawyers made appropriate ob-
jections to jury instructions incorporating those presumptions. Peti-
tioner made none here. The North Carolina Supreme Court passed 
on the validity of the instructions anyway. The States, if they wish, 
may be able to insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and 
valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any 
claim of error. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 3Q.2S 
question as to what is meant by retroactivity. Should, for example, Miller have received a retrial 
on the theory that under the new rule his strategy at trial would have been dilferent? If so, what 
burden, if any, should he have had to demonstrate how the old rule distorted the facts or his 
strategy at trial? The other side of that question, of course, involves a determination by the state 
courts as to the method they should use to decide when a command of retroactivity may be satis-
fied merely by appellate review. Should, for example, the lower courts borrow from Linkletter a 
consideration of the impact of the new rule upon truth determinations at trial as a standard for 
decidin~ when a case should be retried, as opposed to merely rereviewed? Another case in which 
retroactivity was a lesser issue came down in 1976. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per 
curiam) and infta note 115. · 
21. 432 u.s. 233 (1977). 
22. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The substantive holding in Mullaney was later undercut signifi-
cantly in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
23. 407 U.S. 203 (1972). Ivan V. made retroactive the decision of the Supreme Court in In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), which required juvenile courts to use the reasonable doubt 
standard. 
24. 432 U.S. at 241, and cases cited therein. The conclusion in Hankerson, therefore, was 
that Mullaney would apply retroactively. 
25. Id. at 244 n.8. 
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Thus, the suggestion was made that in collateral pleas for relief, retroac-
tivity could be claimed only by those who had raised the issue in their own 
trials. The way in which such a rule would restrict the effect of a decision for 
retroactivity was demonstrated in Wainwright v. Sykes,26 decided a week after 
Hankerson. Wainwright was not a retroactivity case, but involved a petition 
for habeas corpus on the ground that certain evidence used at trial should 
have been inadmissible. Defendant had not raised the issue at trial as re-
quired by state law, and state courts rejected the plea when it was raised for 
the first time on direct appeal. The Supreme Court also rejected the prisoner's 
plea for relief, reasoning that under the established line of authority habeas 
relief was unavailable to persons who did not raise their objections before the 
state courts in a timely manner, unless it could be shown both that there was 
good cause for the failure to object and that the defendant had been 
prejudiced by what had followed.27 
Read in light of Wainwright and earlier cases,28 Justice White's footnote 
in Hankerson suggests that large segments of an important body of retroactiv-
ity cases-collateral attacks on prior criminal convictions-might as a practi-
cal matter simply be beyond the scope of the traditional Link/etter/Stova/1 
approach.29 Only those petitioners who objected to the application of existing 
law or who could meet the Wainwright standards for failing to have done so 
would be entitled to make a collateral plea for the application of a law-chang-
ing decision made subsequent to their conviction. Because it is not a retroac-
tivity case, Wainwright does not intimate whether its "cause and prejudice" 
standard can be met when a party failed to object to existing law simply be-
cause the question was novei.3° But Wainwright and Hankerson do at least 
suggest that even a decision granting retroactivity will benefit only those par-
ties with the foresight to have anticipated the law-changing case. 
Wainwright and requirements for timely objection aside, Hankerson was 
also significant for the revival of another retroactivity approach that, while 
faithful to the roots of the Link/etter/Stova/1 doctrine, threatened to limit the 
doctrine as it had evolved. Justice Marshall stated the idea in his concurrence 
in Hankerson: the benefit of retroactive application of changes in constitu-
tional law should be accorded to all criminal convictions not yet final when the 
Supreme Court announces its change.31 For Justice Marshall, that principle 
was a restatement of a view he had held for several years,32 but Hankerson 
26. 433 u.s. 72 (1977). 
27. Id. at 87. 
28. The timely objection requirement discussed in Wainwright has a history predating 
Hankerson. Id. at 77. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 
(1976). 
29. Justice White's footnote in Hankerson spoke of insulating "past convictions" from the 
consequences of retroactivity, 432 U.S. at 244 n.8, but at that time the Court was silent about the 
use of a timely objection rule to stifle pleas in pending cases for retroactivity. 
30. Recently the Supreme Court refused to address that question. See i'!fra text accompany-
ing note 84. 
3 L 432 U.S. at 245 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
32. See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 665-66 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring in 
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was the first time Justice Powell rallied to that standard.33 
The idea was first set out in 1969, when Justice Harlan dissented from a 
decision making a law-changing decision prospective: 
Upon reflection, I can no longer accept the rule first announced two 
years ago ... which permits this Court to apply a "new" constitu-
tional rule entirely prospectively, while making an exception only for 
the particular litigant whose case was chosen as the vehicle for estab-
lishing that rule. Indeed, I have concluded that Linkletter was right 
in insisting that all "new" rules of constitutional law must, at a mini-
mum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject to direct 
review by this Court at the time the "new" decision is handed 
down.34 
Justice Harlan explained that his criticism of the existing rule, which in some 
cases allowed complete prospectivity, did not focus merely upon the unfairness 
of giving relief to a chance beneficiary while other similarly situated litigants 
were not so favored. The criticism also took account of the damage general 
prospectivity could do the judicial rulemaking process. Positing a situation in 
which an appellate court announced a new rule subsequently adopted by the 
Supreme Court in a separate case-one in which the Supreme Court made its 
rule prospective-Justice Harlan wondered whether the Court would find it-
self obligated to reverse the appellate tribunal that had anticipated the new 
rule simply because the decision of the Supreme Court had been for prospec-
tivity.35 In the same dissent Justice Harlan also made clear that in most cir-
cumstances he would deny the benefit of retroactivity to collateral attacks 
upon criminal convictions.36 But his advocacy of an approach that would au-
part and dissenting in part) (criminal cases on direct review should be accorded the benefit of 
retroactivity). 
33. 432 U.S. at 246-48. 
34. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan's 
suggestion that he, not the majority, was truer to Linkletter referred to the passages in the majority 
opinion in Linkletter in which the Court held "that a change in the law will be given effect while a 
case is on direct review'' and "no distinction [will be] drawn between civil and etiminallitigation." 
381 U.S. at 627. The intervening case that, in Justice Harlan's opinion, deviated from the true 
principle of Linkletter was Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), in which the Court decided a 
retroactivity question in favor of prospectivity, save for the case at bar. That particular litigation 
received the benefit of the law changing rule: 
[The situation presents] an unavoidable consequence of the necessity that constitutional 
adjudications not stand as mere dictum. Sound policies of decision-making, rooted in 
the command of Article III of the Constitution that we resolve issues solely in concrete 
cases or controversies, and in the possible effect upon the incentive of counsel to advance 
contentions requiring a change in the law, militate against denying Wade and Gilbert the 
benefit of today's decisions. Inequity arguably results from according th: benefit of a 
new rule to the parties in the case in which it is announced but not to other litigants 
similarly situated in the trial or appellate process who have raised the same issue. But 
we regard the fact that the parties involved are chance beneficiaries as an insignificant 
cost for adherence to sound principles of decision-making. 
/d. at 301. Justice Harlan had concurred in the prospectivity result in Stovall, id. at 303, a position 
he later renounced. 394 U.S. at 258-59. 
35. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
36. /d. at 260. It should be noted that while Justice Marshall embraced Justice Harlan's 
proposal to accord the benefit of retroactivity to all convictions not yet final, he disagreed with 
Justice Harlan's view that retroactivity might not be appropriate at all for collateral matters. On 
752 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
tomatically apply to new constitutional rules retroactively to pending criminal 
·cases has persisted, impeding the progress of the majority's contrary view. 
Two years later Justice Harlan elaborated upon the same themes. Accus-
ing the majority of adopting a rule that turned the lower courts into "auto-
matons," he attacked as "indefensible" the practice of "[s]imply fishing one 
case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing 
new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases 
subsequently to flow by unaffected . . . ."37 Appalling as the refusal to make 
new constitutional rules retroactive to pending criminal cases seemed to Jus-
tice Harlan, he saw an obvious difference when the plea before the Court was 
for retroactivity for collateral attacks: 
While men languish in jail, not uncommonly for over a year, await-
ing a first trial on their guilt or innocence, it is not easy to justify 
expending substantial quantities of the time and energies of judges, 
prosecutors, and defense lawyers litigating the validity under present 
law of criminal convictions that were perfectly free from error when 
made finaP8 
Whatever the merit of his position, Justice Harlan was never able to attract a 
majority of the Court during his tenure,39 and there came a time when his 
view seemed on its way to sure demise.40 Justice Powell's alignment with Jus-
tice Marshall on the issue in Hankerson, therefore, was important in keeping 
the flame alive. 
Following Hankerson, the Court was silent on retroactivity issues until 
January 1979, when it released two per curiam opinions. Harlin v. Missouri41 
and Lee v. Missouri42 addressed the retroactivity of Duren v. Missouri,43 in 
which a provision of state law permitting women to abstain from jury duty 
was stricken as violating the sixth amendment right to a jury pool representa-
tive of the community. Neither Harlin nor Lee was of fundamental impor-
tance, but the cases did add some information to Justice White's terse footnote 
in Hankerson. Harlin indicated that the absence of a timely objection would 
not be fatal to a collateral attack if state courts somehow waived the defect,44 
that point Justice Marshall preferred a Link/etter/Stova/1 approach. Williams v. United States, 
401 U.S. 646, 666 (1971). Justice Powell, on the other hand, seems to have accepted the totality of 
Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity. Hankerson, 432 U.S. at 248. 
37. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
38. Id. at 691. Justice Harlan also pointed out that in civil cases the overriding interest of 
society in finality made collateral attacks on final judgments almost unthinkable. He noted, "This 
is not to suggest that civil and criminal collateral attack ought necessarily to be precisely congru· 
ent in the federal system. But certainly it illustrates that the law has always perceived collateral 
attack as a problem quite different from direct appeal." Id. at 683 n.2. 
39. See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 656-58 (1971). 
40. See Beytagh, supra note 11, at 1576-79. 
41. 439 U.S. 459 (1979) (per curiam). 
42. 439 U.S. 461 (1979) (per curiam). 
43. 439 u.s. 357 (1979). 
44. 439 U.S. at 459: 
The record did not reflect that petitioner had raised this objection in timely fashion in 
the trial court, but because the trial court had considered and rejected the contention on 
its merits in connection with petitioner's motion for a new trial, the Missouri Supreme 
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and both cases show that the requirement of a timely objection, which Justice 
White's footnote in Hankerson had attached only to jury instructions, went to 
other matters of law as well. As the opinion in Lee stated: 
We note that in any case in which a jury was sworn subsequent to 
Taylor v. Louisiana and the fair-cross-section claim based on exclu-
sion of women was rejected on direct review or in state collateral 
proceedings because of the defendant's failure to assert the claim in 
timely fashion, relief is unavailable under 28 U.S. C. § 2254 [federal 
habeas corpus] unless the petitioner can show cause for having failed 
to raise his claim properly in the state courts.45 
The Supreme Court decided only one retroactivity case in 1980. Brown v. 
Louisiana46 involved the retroactivity of Burch v. Louisiana,47 in which the 
Court had held that convictions for nonpetty offenses by nonunanimous juries 
of six persons or less violated the sixth amendment. Justice Brennan's opinion 
for the Court presented the standard three-factor analysis, and stressed the 
primacy of the purpose to be served by a new rule. Justice Brennan concluded 
that the purpose of Burch was to preserve the right to a jury trial and, at the 
same time, to protect the accuracy of fact determinations at trial. Thus, Brown 
determined that Burch was to be applied retroactively.48 Justice Powell's con-
currence in Brown restated the view he first adopted in Hankerson-law-
changing decisions should be applied retroactively to all criminal cases pend-
ing direct review.49 Moreover, Justice Stevens also adhered to that view. 
Counting Justice Marshall-who voted with the plurality in Brown but who 
has long espoused the view to which Justices Powell and Stevens are recent 
converts-three members of the 1980 Court believed that retroactivity should 
be automatic for changes of law relevant to pending criminal cases. Justice 
Harlan's view, although not yet adopted by any majority of the Court, had 
shown surprising vitality. · 
An important retroactivity decision was delivered by the Court early in 
1981. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord50 involved a defendant who filed 
a motion to disqualify plaintiff's attorney. When the trial court denied the 
motion, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on 
the theory that such a denial was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.51 The 
appellate court disagreed, but made its holding purely prospective-not appli-
Court reviewed the issue under its "plain error'' rule . . . . The highest state court hav-
ing reached and decided this issue, its judgment is subject to review in this Court. 
See also Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979), a direct appeal of a criminal conviction, in 
which the Supreme Court held that "[a]lthough petitioners did not raise the ju1y trial issue in the 
trial court, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that under state law it could consider petitioners' 
claim, and it disposed of that claim .... The federal question therefore is properly raised in this 
Court." /d. at 133 n.5. Burch is not a retroactivity case. 
45. 439 U.S. at 462. Accord Harlin v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 459 (1979). 
46. 447 u.s. 323 (1980). 
47. 441 u.s. 130 (1979). 
48. 447 U.S. at 327-29. 
49. ld at 337. 
50. 449 u.s. 368 (1981). 
51. 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1976). 
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cable even to the case at bar-in light of its prior rule under which the appeal 
was permissible.52 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, 
reversed the decision of the appellate court in favor of prospectivity, but upon 
a basis that took the decision outside the scope of Linkleller. As Justice Mar-
shall wrote: 
the finality requirement embodied in § 1291 is jurisdictional in na-
ture. If the appellate court finds that the order from which a party 
seeks to appeal does not fall within the statute, its inquiry is over. A 
court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is 
without jurisdiction, and thus, by definition, a jurisdictional ruling 
may never be made prospective only.53 
That analysis has a history deeper than those few cryptic sentences, de-
void of any citations to authority, would suggest. Early in the 1970s the 
Supreme Court began to fashion an exception to standard Link/e/ler/Stova/1 
retroactivity analysis for cases in which certain fundamental rights were at 
stake. In United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 54 a forfeiture action 
the Court treated as equivalent to a criminal prosecution, a narrow majority of 
the Court made retroactive its previous holding that federal tax statutes re-
quiring gamblers to register and pay gambling taxes violated the fifth amend-
ment freedom from self-incrimination.55 The decisions at issue, Justice 
Harlan wrote, "dealt with the kind of conduct that cannot constitutionally be 
punished in the first instance. These cases held that gamblers in [the party in 
interest's] position had the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in the face 
of the statute's command that they submit reports which could incriminate 
them."56 A determination that such cases demand retroactive application, 
Justice Harlan reasoned, 
follows a fortiori from those decisions mandating the retroactive ap-
plication of those new rules which substantially improve the accu-
racy of the factfinding process at trial. In those cases, retroactivity 
was held required because the failure to employ such rules at the trial 
meant there was a significant chance that innocent men had been 
wrongfully punished in the past. In the case before us, however, 
even the use of impeccable factfinding procedures could not legiti-
mate a verdict decreeing forfeiture, for we have held that the conduct 
being penalized is constitutionally immune from punishment. No 
circumstances call more for the invocation of a rule of complete 
retroactivity. 57 
52. 449 U.S. at 372-73 (citing In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d 377, 378-79 
(8th Cir. 1980)). 
53. Id. at 379. 
54. 401 u.s. 715 (1971). 
55. The cases at issue were Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), and Marchetti v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). 
56. 401 U.S. at 723. 
57. Id. at 723-24. Justice Harlan added a footnote to restate his view that when a criminal 
case has not yet become final before the law-changing decision is announced, retroactivity should 
ipso facto be granted. Id. at 724 n.l3. 
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Two years later, in Robinson v. Nei/,58 the Supreme Court accorded retro-
active effect to its decision in Waller v. Florida,59 in which the Court had held 
that the use of city and state law to afford two separate prosecutions for the 
same offense violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the breakthrough 
in retroactivity analysis that occurred in Linkletter made it possible to contem-
plate prospectivity for cases such as Waller. Neither prospectivity nor Linklet-
ter/ Stovall, however, were appropriate devices for double jeopardy: 
The guarantee against double jeopardy is significantly different from 
procedural guarantees held in the Linkletter line of cases to have pro-
spective effect only. While this guarantee, like the others, is a consti-
tutional right of the criminal defendant, its practical result is to 
prevent a trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe pro-
cedural rules that govern the conduct of a triai.60 
Both United States Coin and Robinson justify their retroactivity result 
without a Linkletter analysis in important part because Linkletter/Stovall af-
fected constitutionally mandated matters of procedure, and was thus different 
from the substantive rights of freedom from self-incrimination and double 
jeopardy. That logic might have carried the Supreme Court to automatic ret-
roactivity in Gosa v. Mayden 61 as well. Gosa resolved the retroactivity of 
O'Callahan v. Parker,62 in which the Court had held that armed forces person-
nel were not subject to trial by court martial for nonservice offenses. Conclud-
ing that a Linkletter/Stovall approach was the correct method for addressing 
the retroactivity question, Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion distinguished 
United States Coin on the ground that it, unlike Gosa, involved conduct that 
ought not to have been punished in the first place.63 Less convincingly, Justice 
Blackmun rejected the approach of Robinson because it, in some not clearly 
specified way, was different.64 Only three members of the Court, under the 
leadership of Justice Marshall, thought Gosa should be controlled by United 
States Coin and Robinson because it was a jurisdictional matter.65 
Justice Marshall's dissent in Gosa is useful for making explicit the idea 
that, at least in the eyes of a strong minority of the Court, United States Coin 
58. 409 u.s. 505 (1973). 
59. 397 u.s. 387 (1970). 
60. 409 U.S. at 509. Although Robinson is mentioned quite often in consonance with U1Jiled 
States Coin, see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2589 (1982), at no point in his 
opinion did Justice Rehnquist mention United States Coin. 
Also of some interest is that Robinson was a habeas petition, suggesting that when substantive 
and procedural issues may be distinguished, the Court is of one voice in holding that substantive 
questions should not be affected by the collateral or direct nature of the case in which retroactivity 
is sought. 
61. 413 u.s. 665 (1973). 
62. 395 u.s. 258 (1969). 
63. 413 U.S. at 677. 
64. Justice Blackmun explained that Robinson was different because it held that "guarantees 
not related to procedural rules 'cannot, for retroactivity purposes, be lumped conveniently to-
gether in terms of analysis.'" I d. at 678. 
65. Id. at 694. The discussion of United States Coin, Robinson, and Gosa relies in part on 
Professor Beytagh's work. See Beytagh, supra note 11, at 1579-91. 
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and Robinson reached a result of automatic retroactivity outside the scope of 
the Linkletter doctrine because they involved jurisdictional questions as well 
as nonprocedural constitutional rights. The decision in Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co. v. Risjord,66 therefore, did not break new ground. Instead, it reas-
serted the jurisdictional basis for United States Coin and Robinson that Justice 
Marshall and others had articulated in Gosa. Moreover, Risjord revived that 
analysis in a context involving no substantive right of any party, but only the 
purely procedural question of the timing of an appeal. Apart from represent-
ing a vindication of the dissent in Gosa, Risjord indicated that the Linklet-
ter I Stovall approach would no longer be appropriate for law-changing 
decisions that restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of a court.67 Had Risjord 
been the final word, such decisions could never have been primarily prospec-
tive in application. As subsequent decisions demonstrate, however, Risjord 
was far from final. 
The other 1981 case to address a question of retroactivity was Gulf Off-
shore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. 68 The primary question in Gulf Offshore was the 
applicability of Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt69 to cases arising under 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.70 Liepelt required a trial court to in-
struct the jury in cases arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act that 
personal injury awards are not subject to federal income taxation.71 Liepelt, 
however, was decided while Gulf Ojf.rhore was pending on appeal, so the de-
fendant in Gulf Offshore also raised the argument that Liepelt should have 
only prospective application. 
In a footnote to Gulf Offshore, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court re-
jected the prospectivity argument as "insubstantial."72 When a change in law 
occurs while a case is on direct appeal, he wrote, an appellate court must apply 
the new law to the case before it. Exceptions to that principle which might be 
permitted under Bradley v. School Board of Richmond,73 Justice Powell ex-
plained, could not be activated in private civil suits ''where the change does 
not extinguish a cause of action but merely requires a retrial on damages 
before a properly instructed jury."74 The Bradley decision cited by Justice 
Powell is part of a line of cases calling for nearly automatic retroactivity for 
civil cases pending on appeal, a line of cases that had its antecedents in the era 
of Chief Justice Marshall. In that period, when Blackstone's advocacy of au-
tomatic retroactivity for law-changing decisions still enjoyed preponderant in-
fluence, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Schooner Peggy.15 There 
66. 449 u.s. 368 (1981). 
67. Id at 379. 
68. 453 u.s. 473 (1981). 
69. 444 u.s. 490 (1980). 
70. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
71. 45 u.s.c. §§ 51-60 (1976). 
72. 453 U.S. at 486 n.l6. 
73. 416 U.S. 696, 716-17 (1974). The exception to automatic retroactivity might arise when 
retroactivity would work "manifest injustice," id. at 716, but that term is left undefined in Bradley. 
74. 453 U.S. at 486 n.l6. 
75. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). 
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the Chief Justice wrote that appellate courts were obligated to apply the law as 
it currently exists, including changes intervening between the time of trial and 
final resolution of the appeal,76 Later cases demonstrated that the principle 
was not limited to intervening legislation, but also included law-changing ac-
tivity in which the basis was "constitutional, statutory, or judicial, [or even] 
where the change is made by an administrative agency acting pursuant to leg-
islative authorization."77 How, then, does the line of authority emanating 
from Schooner Peggy exist alongside Linkletter and Chevron? 
Easily enough, as it happens. Justice Blackmun's opinion in Bradley 
drew the key distinction: 
This Court in the past has recognized a distinction between the appli-
cation of a change in the law that takes place while a case is on direct 
review, on the one hand, and its effect on a final judgment under 
collateral attack, on the other hand. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618, 627 (1965). We are concerned here only with direct review.78 
From the beginning, then, Linkletter was never intended to apply to civil cases 
pending before a court on direct review when a change oflaw occurs. For that 
sort of litigation, automatic retroactivity was commanded by Schooner 
Peggy.79 Ironically, the original idea in the Linkletter criminal cases-that 
retroactive benefits should be accorded to all cases pending on direct review-
suffered through a decade of inattention or outright rejection in criminal cases 
heard by the Court in the 1970s, while a substantially similar idea remained 
vital in civil matters. 
The first five months of 1982 were quiet for the Supreme Court in the area 
of retroactivity. Only a few cases dealing with the developing rule of Wain-
wright80 had even secondary significance for retroactivity doctrine, but they 
suggest that the Wainwright failure-to-object rule may preempt a significant 
body of cases in whichLinkletter/Stovall decisions once held sway. In Rose v. 
Lundy81 the Court held that a "mixed" petition for habeas corpus, consisting 
of issues that were raised in a timely fashion in state court and issues that were 
not so raised, could not be entertained in a federal court. A month later the 
Court held that under the Wainwright "cause and prejudice" test,82 "the futil-
ity of presenting an objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause 
for a failure to object at trial."83 And, tantalizingly, the Court felt the cases 
before it did not require it to: 
76. Id at 110. 
77. Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 282 (1969) (citations omitted). Only five years 
after the Supreme Court made Schooner Peggy applicable to intervening agency decisions, how-
ever, the Court reversed its position. Removing agency changes from the reach of Schooner 
Peggy, the Court directed instead that such a case should be remanded to the ag~ncy, which will 
then make its own retroactivity determination. NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 
347, 417 U.S. 1, 10 n.lO (1974). See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text. 
78. 416 U.S. at 710-11 (footnotes omitted). 
79. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 110. 
80. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
81. 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982). 
82. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
83. Engle v. Issac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1572 (1982) . 
.. 
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decide whether the novelty of a constitutional claim ever establishes 
cause for a failure to object. We might hesitate to adopt a rule that 
would require trial counsel either to exercise extraordinary vision or 
to object to every aspect of the proceedings in the hope that some 
aspect might mask a latent constitutional claim. On the other hand, 
later discovery of a constitutional defect unknown at the time of trial 
does not invariably render the original trial fundamentally unfair.84 
Finally, in a third case the Court concluded that Wainwright barred a collat-
eral attack upon a criminal conviction in which the objection was not timely, 
even if the same issue could have been raised on direct review under the 
"plain error" doctrine. 85 
As they relate to retroactivity questions, therefore, Wainwright and its 
progeny now permit collateral attacks upon prior convictions on the ground 
that the law has changed when: (1) a prisoner can show that he made a timely 
objection; (2) the state waives its timely objection rule; or (3) the prisoner can 
meet the "cause and prejudice" exception to Wainwright. As to the third pos-
sibility, it is not at all clear that the Supreme Court will find "cause" in the 
novelty of a new rule. Beyond those apparently limited exceptions, Wain-
wright now acts as a bar to collateral attacks upon prior convictions. 
June 1982 proved to be as important in retroactivity matters as the previ-
ous five months had been quiet. In Diedrich v. Commissioner86 the Court held 
that donors of property who attach a condition requiring their donees to pay 
applicable federal gift taxes must themselves recognize taxable income to the 
extent that the gift tax owed exceeds the donor's adjusted basis in the property. 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger took up the retroactivity issue in 
one cryptic footnote: 
Petitioners argue that even if this Court holds that a donee realizes 
income on a conditional gift to the extent that the gift exceeds the 
adjusted basis, that holding should be applied prospectively and 
should not apply to the taxpayers in this case. In this case, however, 
there was no dispositive Eighth Circuit holding prior to the decision 
on review. In addition, this Courtfrequently has applied decisions 
which have altered the tax law and applied the clarified law to the 
facts of the case before it. See, e.g. , United States v. Estate of Don-
nelly, 397 U.S. 286, 294-95 (1970).87 
Unfortunately, <~frequently" is an assertion of fact rather than a standard. The 
lower courts are thus left to ponder the circumstances in which tax decisions 
should be made retroactive. 
United States v. Johnson, 88 by contrast, reflected an attempt to present a 
more thoughtful approach to retroactivity analysis. Johnson addressed the ret-
84. Id. at 1573 (footnotes omitted). 
85. United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584 (1982). 
86. 102 S. Ct. 2414 (1982). 
87. Id. at 2420 n.IO (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Note that the quoted material 
disregards the possibility that the taxpayer could have relied upon decisions in other circuits or 
even upon a blank slate. 
88. 102 S. Ct. 2579 (1982). 
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roactivity of the holding of the Supreme Court in Payton v. New York 89 that 
"the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and 
nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to make a routine felony arrest."90 
By a five to four vote, Johnson made Payton retroactive, but the scope of retro-
activity and the manner in which the decision was cast were more important 
than the immediate result. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun an-
nounced that the three-factor purpose-reliance-effect test-:-which he associ-
ated primarily with Stovall v . .Denno 91-would no longer be applicable to law-
changing fourth amendment decisions affecting criminal litigation that was 
not yet final. Instead, the Court held that fourth amendment litigation not yet 
final would automatically be afforded the benefit of retroactivity-a position 
akin to that which Justice Harlan espoused more than a decade ago.92 
Justice Blackmun reached that decision by recasting much of existing 
criminal retroactivity analysis. There were three categories of decisions, he 
explained, that had never been subject to the three-factor test of Stovall. The 
retroactivity of these cases had been decided merely "through application of a 
threshold test."93 Those categories were: (1) cases in which the Court "merely 
has applied settled precedents to new and different factual situations;" (2) rules 
of criminal procedure that represented " 'a clear break with the past;' " and (3) 
rulings "that a trial court lacked authority to convict or punish a criminal de-
fendant in the first place."94 In all those circumstances, Justice Blackmun 
wrote, retroactivity was compelled without resort to a Stovall analysis. Pay-
ton, he acknowledged, fit none of those catagories, but that did not make it a 
decision subject to the three-factor retroactivity test of Stovall. Instead, it 
meant that Justice Harlan had been correct from the beginning-fourth 
amendment decisions such as Payton should "be applied retroactively to all 
convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered."95 
The result, of course, is that the Stovall doctrine-or the Linklet-
ter/Stovall doctrine-will apply in the future only to retroactivity petitions 
89. 445 u.s. 573 (1980). 
90. 102 S. Ct. at 2581. 
91. 388 u.s. 293 (1967). 
92. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court made explicit its 
decision that the new rule applied only to fourth amendment decisions. United States v. Johnson, 
102 S. Ct. at 2594. 
93. 102 S. Ct. at 2587 (footnotes omitted). 
94. ld (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969)). 
95. /d. at 2594. It is not entirely clear from Justice Blackmun's opinion that he perceived a 
distinction between making a decision retroactive "to all cases still pending on direct appeal," id. 
at 2590, and making it retroactive "to all those cases which are still subject to direct review by this 
Court." /d at 258o(quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,258 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing)). See also id. at 2590 (retroactivity for "all nonfinal convictions"); id. at 2594 (retroactivity for 
"all convictions that were not yet final"); id. at 2590 (retroactivity "to all cases pending on direct . 
review"). The difference is important, for the application of retroactive benefits to all cases not yet 
final encompasses litigation that has not yet reached the appellate level as well as appeals pending 
when the law-changing decision was announced. Moreover, Justice Blackmun describes his new 
rule as "consistent with" the civil doctrine of Schooner Peggy, id. at 2583, but that doctrine seems 
only to apply to cases that were at the appellate level when the law-changing decision came down, 
and not to cases at some earlier stage of litigation. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text; 
see also i'!fra notes 251-65 and accompanying text. 
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that were collateral attacks upon final convictions or direct appeals in which 
the fourth amendment was not at issue. Inasmuch as Justice Blackmun ac-
knowledged that many of the collateral matters will not reach federal courts 
for failure to preserve issues with timely objections,96 one result of Johnson is 
a substantial limitation upon the three-factor doctrine as it has developed. 
The majority also used Johnson as an occasion to submit a few words 
regarding retroactivity in civil matters. Presumably, the comments were in-
tended as clarification. Justice Blackmun wrote that "all questions of civil ret-
roactivity continue to be governed by the standard enunciated in Chevron Oil 
Co. v. Huson ."91 Taken literally, that would mean the doctrine of Schooner 
Peggy and other special analyses affecting certain civil cases98 are destroyed. 
It is possible, of course, that the Supreme Court intends exactly that result. It 
may also be, however, that the Court simply seeks the more modest goal of 
ensuring that the Chevron approach is differentiated from Linkletter/ Stovall. 
Two bits of evidence support the latter thesis. The first is that the Court 
also cited Schooner Peggy approvingly, even to the point of suggesting that it 
was a model for the rule enunciated inJohnson.99 Moreover, the Court spoke 
of Chevron as distinct from Stovall because Chevron had a "clear break" pre-
requisite the Court could not find in Stovall or other analyses relevant to crim-
inal matters.100 Such evidence is admittedly far from dispositive. It is also 
contradicted in some measure by the Court's use of Chevron in its very last 
retroactivity decision of the 1981 term-a case that, prior to Johnson, would 
arguably have called for application of one of the special retroactivity analy-
ses.101 But that evidence, in tum, is undercut by the Court's additional cita-
tion, in that same case, to one of the additional retroactivity analyses 
apparently outside the scope of Chevron .102 
The last retroactivity case decided in June 1982 was Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.l03 The Supreme Court held that 
portions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978104 granting jurisdiction over certain 
96. 102 S. Ct. at 2594 n.20. 
97. Id. at 2594-95 (citations omitted). The Court also used Johnson to make three lesser 
points. First, it suggested, if it did not say explicitly, that the reliance factor in some retroactivity 
analyses could be satisfied by "a near-unanimous body of lower court authority", id. at 2589 & 
n.15 (footnote omitted), but perhaps not by a body of lower court authority that was less than 
nearly unanimous. Second, the Court expressly rejected the notion that the logic of United States 
v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), required nearly automatic prospectivity for fourth amendment 
cases. 102 S. Ct. at 2592-93. Finally, the Court indicated that law-changing decisions substan-
tially affecting the accuracy of fact-finding at trial would receive nearly automatic retroactivity 
under the Linkleller/Stova/1 rule. I d. at 2594 n.21. 
98. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text; infta notes 236-50, 266-85 and accompany-
ing text. 
99. 102 S. Ct. at 2583. 
100. Id. at 2587 n.l2. 
101. Seeinfta notes 103-105 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 50-60 and accompa-
nying text. 
102. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2880 n.41 
(1982) (citing Buckle).' v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976) (per curiam)). The approach in Buckley to 
retroactivity is descnbed infta note 115. 
103. 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). 
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. V 1981). 
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bankruptcy matters to non-Article III judges were unconstitutional. The 
Court used a Chevron approach to determine the retroactivity of its holding: 
It is plain that Congress' broad grant of judicial power to non-Art. III 
bankruptcy judges presents an unprecedented question of interpreta-
tion of Art. III. It is equally plain that retroactive application would 
not further the operation of our holding, and would surely visit sub-
stantial injustice and hardship upon those litigants who relied upon 
the Act's vesting of jurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts. We hold, 
therefore, that our decision today shall apply only prospectively. 105 
The result seems reasonable enough. But the conclusion, and the rationale 
upon which it is based-reliance upon Chevron in a jurisdictional matter--do 
violence to the recently expressed intent of the Court that jurisdictional deci-
sions will ipso facto apply retroactively. 106 
As the foregoing chronology may indicate, the approach of the Supreme 
Court to retroactivity at any one moment is difficult to predict. Any given 
holding will at best clarify the present state of the law, or cast light upon past 
developments. An assessment of the status of retroactivity analysis at the end 
of the 1981 term, therefore, should be primarily a statement of what is, and 
only a most guarded estimate of what may come. 
Some directions nevertheless emerge. The first is that there is more than 
one retroactivity analysis; in fact, there are several, with the precise number 
unclear and possibly changing. The status of the analysis that has attracted 
the most attention over the past two decades, the Linkletter/Stova/1 approach, 
appears to be declining. That analysis, which was never a terribly reliable 
predictor of future retroactivity decisions, 107 now seems restricted to two bod-
105. 102 S. Ct. at 2880 (footnote omitted). 
106. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall, who wrote the majority 
opinion inRisjord, voted with the majority in Northern Pipeline without comment. Separate from 
the jurisdictional issue, one circuit believes that retroactivity was normally the rule for changes in 
law occurring before bankruptcy adjudication became final. In re Spell, 650 F.2d 375, 377 (2d 
Cir. 1981). Although that point of view is not necessarily inconsistent with the concern of the 
Supreme Court about the impact of retroactivity for Northern Pipeline, the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit also added the following comment: "It is noteworthy that this rule was applied 
even though the result for the bankrupt was harsh." I d. But see Cle-W are Indus. v. Sokolsky, 493 
F.2d 863 (6th Cir.) (prospective application of new rule on attorney's fees in bankruptcy litiga-
tion), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 829 (1974). 
107. See Vaccaro v. United States: 
Perhaps no other area of Constitutional law is more enshrouded in puzzlement and ap-
parent logical inconsistencies . . . . A catalogue of some of the • . . retroactivity hold-
ings demonstrat~ the perplexities. For example, while the right to counsel at a 
preliminary hearing where the defendant makes incriminating statements is retroactively 
recognized, the right to counsel during accusatorial police interrogation during which the 
accused makes incriminating statements is not retroactively enforced. Similarly, while 
the defendant's right to a fair, impartial and unbiased jury is retroactively effected, the 
right to an impartial judge may be given prospective application only. Likewise, the 
defendant is entitled to retroactive protection against the extrajudicial confessions of a 
co-defendant, but not of himself. 
Systematic exclusion of Blacks from juries call for retroactive vindication, but sys-
tematiC exclusion of women apparently does not. Newly announced standards for deter-
mining the voluntariness of confessions are retroactive, but newly announced standards 
for determining the voluntariness of guilty pleas are not. 
461 F.2d 626, 628-29 (5th Cir. 1972) (footnotes omitted). 
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ies of retroactivity issues-collateral attacks upon final convictions and direct 
appeals outside the scope of the fourth amendment-and is besieged even in 
the area of collateral attacks. 
Moreover, the categories of cases outside the scope of Linkleller/Siovall 
are more numerous and may be growing. Schooner Peggy has always been a 
bulwark againstLinkleller/Siovall expansion into civil cases pending on direct 
appeal. lOB Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co. 109 is similarly predominant 
in diversity litigation. Johnson now prohibits the use of Linkleller/Siovall in 
fourth amendment cases pending on direct appeal, and perhaps in all such 
cases in which the conviction is not yet final.11o Chevron, for now, is identified 
as a distinct retroactivity analysis applicable at least to categories of civil cases 
not claimed by Schooner Peggy or Vandenbark .111 Law-changing decisions 
restricting the jurisdiction of courts may112 or may not 113 be subject to a spe-
cial rule of automatic retroactivity. Even if they are not, there is no indication 
that such cases would otherwise be placed under the frayed banner of Litrklel· 
/er/Siovall. Certain distinct bodies oflaw, "frequently" including tax law,114 
seem to be governed only by their own rules of retroactivity or prospectiv-
ity. us Finally, in one of the two areas that Linkletter I Stovall still dominates 
-criminal convictions under collateral attack-developing requirements for 
the timely objections threaten to reduce to a residue the number of cases actu-
108. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 251-65 and accompany-
ing text. 
109. 311 U.S. 538 (1941). See infra notes 236-45 and accompanying text. 
110. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. 
111. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra notes 61-65, 103-06 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
115. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (commis-
sion appointments stricken because the process of appointment was unconstitutional). Concern-
ing retroactivity: 
[i]t is also our view that the Commission's inability to exercise certain powers because of 
the method by which its members have been selected should not affect the validity of the 
Commission's administrative actions and determinations to this date, including its ad· 
ministration of those provisions, upheld today, authorizing the public financing of fed· 
era! elections. The past acts of the Commission are therefore accorded de facto validity, 
just as we have recognized should be the case with respect to legislative acts performed 
by legislators held to have been elected in accordance with an unconstitutional appor-
tionment plan. 
Id at 142 (citations omitted). 
Note the absence of any reference to Linkleller/Siovall or Chevron, or any development of the 
three factors to be considered under those analyses. See also Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 301 
(1975) (making prospective a decision invalidating statutes restricting the electoral franchise for 
city bond elections; prospectivity justified because it is necessary ''to avoid the possibility of upset· 
ting previous bond elections in the States"); NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347, 
417 U.S. 1, 10 n.IO (1974) (when agency policy changes, court should remand so agency can make 
determination on retroactivity); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (reaching the 
same conclusion as Hill, 421 U.S. 289 (1975), with passing cite to Linkleller, and justifyinp pros-
pectivity on the ground of retroactivity's "substantial inequitable results"). Notwithstandmg the 
casual cite in Cipriano to Linkleller and the use of the "effect" factor of that analysis, both Cipri-
ano and Hill are actually part of an older line of decisions calling for prospectivity when the 
process by which bonds are issued is stricken. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State 
Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940). 
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ally able to claim access to Linkletter/Stova/1.116 A relatively young doctrine 
may already have seen its best days. 
The importance of developments in the Supreme Court, of course, is de-
termined to a significant degree by the extent to which Supreme Court rules 
filter into the fabric of decision-making in the lower courts. It is within those 
less sublime bodies, those "pawns, foot soldiers, worker bees of law," 117 that 
the great mass of our litigation is finally resolved. It would be useful, there-
fore, to examine retroactivity decisions covering the past decade in the lower 
federal courts. That body of information should help clarify the manner in 
which Supreme Court rules have been construed, the areas in which lower 
courts have struggled, and the reasons why lower courts experienced varying 
degrees of success or failure. A reader would be well advised to keep in mind, 
however, that the course of this examination may reveal as much about the 
state of judicial administration as about retroactivity decisions over the last 
decade. He may, in fact, discover that the efficient operation of a judicial sys-
tem such as the United States enjoys depends as much upon careful supervi-
sion and administration of lower courts as it does upon development of well-
reasoned doctrine. 
The organization of the inquiry will proceed as follows: the application 
of the more complex doctrines .of Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron will be ex-
amined first, particularly with a view to exploring the manner in which the 
substrata of those analyses operate together; cases involving other, more spe-
cialized retroactivity doctrines will next be discussed. 
II. RETROACTIVITY AND THE LoWER CouRTS 
A. Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron 
1. The Requirement of Novelty 
It would seem to be implicit in the Linkletter/Stovall doctrine that the 
possibility of prospective application of a law-changing decision can arise only 
when the rule at issue is in some meaningful sense a new rule. 118 This notion, 
implicit in Linkletter/Stovall, was articulated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, in 
which the Supreme Court held that prospectivity was a possible result only in 
116. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. 
117. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 11 {1973). 
118. Justice Clark's opinion in Linkletter makes it clear that the Court considered its rule in 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the prospectivity of which was at issue inLinldetter, to be new 
law. Justice Clark noted, "AlthoughMapp may not be considered to be an oven-uling decision in 
the sense that it did not disturb [an] earlier holding ... its effect certainly was to change law with 
regard to enforcement of the right." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 619 n.1 (1965); cf. United 
States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2587 (1982): 
when a decision of this Court merely has applied settled precedents to new ;md different 
factual situations, no real question has arisen as to whether the later decision should 
apply retrospectively. In such cases, it has been a foregone conclusion that the rule of 
the later case applies in earlier cases, because the later decision has not in fact altered 
that rule in any material way. 
There was a time when novelty seemed no longer required in one category of cases, but the re-
quirement was reinstated recently. See i!ifra notes 286-301 and accompanying text. 
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cases in which a court first established that the decision at issue decided "a 
new principle oflaw" or addressed "an issue of first impression." 119 Even if 
Chevron had not been so explicit, however, it is fundamental that the rule 
whose retroactivity is at issue be a newly announced rule, for if it is not new, 
its application to pending or future cases would seem in no sense to fall under 
a retroactivity analysis. 120 It is at least arguable, therefore, that novelty has 
always been required before a court may undertake consideration of either the 
Linkletter/Stoval/ or Chevron analysis. 
For the most part, the lower courts have accepted the logic of the novelty 
requirement. The circuit courts, in fact, have been emphatic in demanding 
novelty as a prerequisite to retroactivity analysis in both civil and criminal 
matters.121 Even on this basic point, however, there are mavericks, some of 
whom may be found in the same circuits whose published opinions rely heav-
ily upon the element of novelty. In Jenkins v. United States Civil Service Com-
119. 404 u.s. 97, 106 (1971). 
120. See United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2587 (1982). 
121. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en bane) (before pros· 
pectivity may be considered, there must first be an expansion of the exclusionary rule, not merely 
a restatement or application of an existing rule), rev'd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); 
NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745, 757 (7th Cir. 1981) ("in the instant case, the 
matter seems settled for us because [inter alia] the new rule was not an unforeshadowed departure 
from the Board's previously existing practice"), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1982); Kremer v. 
Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786,789 (2d Cir. 1980) (nonretroactivity not applicable because 
decision was foreshadowed in Second Circuit), affd, 102 S. Ct. 1883 (1982); Valencia v. Anderson 
Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1279 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Having decided that our ruling in this case 
establishes no new principle oflaw, it is unnecessary to address the remaining prongs of the C!Jev-
ron Oil test"}, rev'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 205 (1981); Everson v. McLouth Steel Corp., 586 
F.2d 6, 8 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) ("Everson contends that our decision in Guy should not be 
retroactively applied. He relies on Chevron Oil Co . ... In our opinion Chevron Oil is inapposite. 
In Guy we applied our ruling retroactively. We did not overturn previously established law"); 
United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1173 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (''we are convinced that 
Chadwick presents no question of retroactivity because, as we have previously held, we do not 
regard Chadwick as representing a departure from the Supreme Court's long-standing approach to 
the Fourth Amendment"); Bunker v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1977) (retroactivity analysis 
unnecessary if operative case does not overrule clear past precedent or disrupt long accepted prac-
tice); United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 803 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane) (no retroactivity because 
"decision announced no new rule of law; it did not represent any 'sharp break in the web of the 
law'"), cert. denied sub nom. Robles v. United States, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977); Ferguson v. United 
States, 513 F.2d 1011, 1013 (2d Cir. 1975) (operative case foreshadowed by two Second Circuit 
cases; operative case therefore lacked the novelty necessary for a consideration of prospectivity); 
Schaefer v. First Nat'! Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1294 (7th Cir. 1975) (no prospectivity analysis be· 
cause operative case is not sufficiently new}, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); United States v. 
Karp, 508 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 1974) ("the threshold question bearing upon the issue of 
prospective application of a rule under Linkletter v. Walker ... is whether the decision states 
new principles oflaw or merely applies what has always been the law") cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 
(1975); Mayer v. Moeykens, 494 F.2d 855, 857 (2d Cir. 1974), (operative case did not decide a 
sufficiently novel principle, so it is retroactively applied without consideration of other elements of 
retroactiVIty analysis}, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 926 (1974); Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 996 (7th 
Cir. 1973) ("new principle oflaw" factor is primary; "[o]nly if that test is satisfied, do we reach the 
second and third prongs"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 
(1974). 
In Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit took the novelty requirement a step further. The 
court held that the operative decision was "a clear departure from established law when applied to 
informal rulemaking proceedings," and therefore concluded that it should operate prospectively, 
without further discussion of the other factors in a Chevron retroactivity analysis. /d. at 474. 
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mission, 122 a district court in the District of Columbia concluded that the 
decision at issue established no new principle of law. Nevertheless, the court 
went on to make an analysis of how the other prongs of Chevron would weigh 
in a retroactivity analysis. 123 In like manner the Eastern District of New York 
reported in Novak v. Harris that "the decision reached in Golcffarb inevitably 
followed from the precedent established by Frontiero and Wiesenfeld," 124 but 
the court still felt obligated to examine the factors of "purpose" and "equity" 
before concluding that the operative decision- Go/4farb-shou1d be applied 
retroactively. 12S 
Although those cases may be at odds with both the logic of Linklet-
ter/Stovall and Chevron, as well as with the precedents established in most of 
the circuits, 126 the deviation may have been beneficial and was almost cer-
tainly harmless. Courts are, after all, often inclined to provide alternate foun-
dations upon which their decisions can rest by engaging in the potentially 
useful but technically extraneous discussions we term dicta. As long as such 
supplementary material does not contradict reasoning central to the case at 
bar-and there was no contradiction in the results of Jenkins and Novak-the 
apparent digressions do not constitute cause for alarm. 
More troubling, however, is the decision in Gunter v. Merchants Warren 
National Bank .127 Litigation began when the bank sued in state court for 
money owed and at the same time attached defendants' real estate under state 
rules permitting attachment in an ex parte proceeding. Defendants in the state 
suit responded by bringing action in federal court for damages and equitable 
relief, arguing that the preexisting rule of Fuentes v. Shevin, 128 which prohibits 
ex parte replevin of personalty, was applicable to real estate as well. The court 
agreed that Fuentes could be extended to include attatchments of real estate. 
Moreover, because the court also reported that ''we do not regard Fuentes as 
departing from established principles of procedural due process,"129 a conclu-
sion that Gunter would apply retroactively would seem to have followed. In 
fact, however, the court reached almost the exactly opposite result. Refusing 
to give Fuentes "solely prospective effect," the court compromised: 
122. 460 F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1978). 
123. /d. at 613. 
124. 504 F. Supp. 101, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), struck 
down dependency requirements for widowers' (but not widows') Social Security benefits as violat-
ing the fifth amendment right to equal protection. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), 
held that a statutory grant of survivors' benefits to widows and a denial of such benefits to widow-
ers violated the same constitutional right. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), held that 
a requirement that dependency be established before spouses of female military personnel were 
eligible for certain benefits, in the absence of a similar requirement for spouses of male military 
personnel, also violated the equal protection element of the fifth amendment due process clause. 
·125. 504 F. Supp. at 106-07; accord Cash v. Califano, 469 F. Supp. 129, 132-35 (W.D. Va. 
1979), a/rd, 621 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 447 F. Supp. 192, 196-99 (E.D. 
Pa. 191S), mod(fted on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. dmied, 453 U.S. 913 
(1981). 
126. See supra note 121. 
127. 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973) (three-judge court). 
128. 407 u.s. 67 (1972). 
129. 360 F. Supp. at 1091 n.17. 
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Since a retrospective judgment would cast doubt on the validity of all 
real estate attachments in actions now pending in the Maine courts 
and would create a cloud on the title to any property hitherto sold 
pursuant to a real estate attachment, our decree will be prospective 
only and will have no effect on any attachments, other than the two 
attachments presently before us, which have been made prior to the 
date of this opinion. 130 
The need for novelty was cast aside because it led to retroactivity, and retroac-
tivity led to consequences the court was unwilling to accept. 131 In essence, the 
effect factor identified as part of retroactivity analysis in Linkleller and Chev-
ron was decisive, eclipsing any other considerations within or without the Lin-
kleller/Chevron standard. That result was unusual not only for its apparent 
logical flaw in disregarding the absence of novelty, but also because among the 
Link/etter/Chevron factors, effect is not always predominant. 
2. Priority Among the Factors 
Most lower federal courts have attempted to follow the wavering com-
mand of the Supreme Court that the purpose factor set out in Link/et-
ter/Stova/1 and Chevron be accorded primacy132 in those approaches to 
retroactivity analysis.133 Moreover, and also consistent with Supreme Court 
instruction, 134 the purpose factor usually receives greater deference when the 
newly announced rule is intended to enhance the accuracy of fact-finding at 
trial.135 The importance the lower courts have accorded to accurate fact-find-
130. Id. at 1091. 
131. It should be mentioned that the Gunter decision applied to the parties before the court 
because the judges were concerned about the possibility that a purely prospective holding would 
strip litigants of their incentive to change the law and might otherwise fall short of the "case or 
controversy" requirement of Article III of the Constitution, which is now disregarded in retroac-
tivity matters. See supra note 34. 
132. The primacy of the purpose factor was recently restated in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 
432 U.S. 233, 241 (1977). q. United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2594 n.21 (1982). 
133. See, e.g., Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692, 697 (5th Cir. 1981) (purpose factor "clearly the 
most important"); United States v. Blake, 632 F.2d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 1980) (other factors impor-
tant "only when the purpose of the rule in question [does) not clearly favor either retroactivity or 
prospectivity"); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975) (purpose is primary factor), 
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Brown v. United States, 508 F.2d 618, 625 (3d Ctr. 1974) (same), 
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1027 (1975); United States v. Grant, 489 F.2d 27, 32 (8th Cir. 1973) (same). 
But see NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745, 757 (7th Cir.) ("Since there is a presump· 
tion favoring retroactivity, all three Chevron factors must support prospective application in order 
to limit the retroactive effect of the decision"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). 
134. Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 241 (1977). 
135. See, e.g., White v. Maggio, 556 F.2d 1352, 1355 (5th Cir. 1977) (retroactivity generally 
appropriate when purpose of new rule is to correct serious flaw in factfinding at trial); Harris v. 
Israel, 515 F. Supp. 568, 572 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (when purpose is determination of truth, that con-
sideration will outweigh reliance and affect administration of justice); Owens v. United States, 383 
F. Supp. 780, 786 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (same), qjf'd, 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 
(1975). The lower courts have also tried to follow the rule of the Supreme Court that when truth· 
finding is not "substantially" affected, Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 243 (1977), the 
purpose factor will not weigh so heavily in favor of retroactivity. In United States v. O'Shea, 479 
F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1973), Judge Coffin co=ented that while a particular rule was both "salutary 
and important" and went to the accuracy of sentencing procedures based on presentence reports, 
the court was obligated to weigh probabilities to determine whether erroneous reports were likely 
to have affected prison sentences significantly. Id. at 314. Accord Basset v. Smith, 464 F.2d 347, 
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ing becomes most obvious in cases in which fact-finding was held not to be a 
substantial purpose of a new rule. InMartin v. "Wyrick, 136 for example, a state 
convict sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that he had been denied the 
right to represent himself, a right the Supreme Court subsequently recognized 
as constitutionally based. 137 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in-
troduced its retroactivity analysis by agreeing that purpose "is the paramount 
consideration."138 But then, having concluded that the purpose of the rule at 
issue did not go substantially to fact-finding, the panel reasoned that the ab-
sence of an important fact-finding purpose behind the change in law "strongly 
suggests the rule should not be made retroactive." 139 Similarly, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that when a new rule of criminal procedure 
does not affect the determination of truth at trial, it should be applied only 
prospectively.140 
Such cases are representative of the determination by the lower courts to 
follow faithfully the lead of the Supreme Court in establishing the priority of 
the purpose factor, but on this point there has also been considerable confu-
sion and backsliding. A district court in California, ruling upon a federal con-
vict's petition to vacate his sentence under a change oflaw promulgated by the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reasoned that the reliance factor was 
"of utmost importance" and justified that position by citing the Supreme 
Court's view of its own power in the area of retroactivity: "Of course, overrid-
ing all of the specific criteria which govern the Court in this determination is 
the general rule that 'the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule 
prospective . . . where the exigencies of the situation require such an applica-
tion.' Linkletter v. Walker, . .. 381 U.S. at 628."141 Another district court, in 
Pennsylvania, reached the conclusion that "[t]his test [Chevron's] is all inclu-
sive; each aspect must be met.'' 142 
Such inconsistency in the district courts is not surprising, because all the 
circuits are not certain that the purpose factor is primary. The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in fact, has twice concluded that the 
349 (5th Cir. 1972) ("[T)he [Supreme] Court has recognized that 'the extent to which a condemned 
practice infects the integrity of the truth-determining process at trial is a question of probabilities.' 
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298"), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973). 
136. 568 F.2d 583 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 975 (1978). 
137. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
138. 568 F.2d at 587. 
139. ld. 
140. See United States ex rel Cannon v. Johnson, 536 F.2d 1013, 1016-17 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 928 (1976); accord United States v. Powell, 449 F. Supp. 562, 564 (E.D. Pa. 1978) 
(new constitutional rules the purpose of which is not to improve accuracy of factfinding receive 
prospective treatment). 
141. Alaway v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 978, 982 (C.D. Cal. 1972). In fact, however, the 
passage this court cited in Linkletter did not stand so much for freedom to choose among the 
factors as for the view of the Supreme Court that while the Court had routinely permitted cases to 
be applied retroactively in the past, it was not bound to do so. Moreover, one co=entator be-
lieves the Supreme Court has identified reliance as the least important factor in the Linkletter 
analysis. Blumenfeld, Retroactivity qfter O'Cal!ahan: An Analytical and Statistical Approach, 60 
GEO. LJ. 551, 571 (1972). 
142. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1357 v. Leonard, 450 F. Supp. 663, 666 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
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purpose factor is secondary to reliance. National Association of Broadcasters 
v. FCC143 was a suit to force a refund of certain fees paid to an agency. Plain-
tiffs and others had previously challenged the fee schedule of the agency in the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but had lost in that court. 144 Some of 
those plaintiffs took the case to the Supreme Court and won, but the parties in 
the instant case-who were from different segments of the communications 
industry-had not pursued the case on appeal. Normally that lapse would 
have precluded plaintiffs in the case at bar from any relief, but the case was 
unusual because the agency had agreed, when litigating before the Fifth Cir-
cuit, that fees paid pending a judicial decision would be refunded in full if the 
litigation before the Fifth Circuit were decided against the agency. When the 
plaintiffs in the case at bar sued for refunds, however, the agency resisted re-
payment by calling for prospectivity of the Supreme Court decision on the 
ground that an agency should be able to rely upon its own rules. 145 The Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was sympathetic to the reason-
ing advanced by the agency, and commented that "[b ]y far the most important 
consideration of the four [factors]l46 is the extent of justifiable reliance on the 
old rule." 147 Because the agency was unable to demonstrate that it had in fact 
relied upon its old rule, the court decided in favor of retroactivity. 148 It does 
seem clear, however, that the court's elevation of reliance to first priority made 
the case a closer decision than it might otherwise have been. 
National Association of Broadcasters is arguably skewed by the agency's 
apparent attempt to avoid its earlier promise to refund, but the decision of the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 
N.A. v. National Student Marketing Corp. 149 contained no such distorting 
facts. Wachovia involved a suit under the federal securities laws150 and turned 
upon a determination of which of two statutes of limitations would be applied. 
The court had recently adopted the shorter of the two limitations, but at the 
time the cause of action arose and the suit was filed, the longer limitation had 
been in use. Citing Chevron as the guideline for its retroactivity analysis, the 
143. 554 F.2d 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
144. Clay Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 464 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1972). 
145. 554 F.2d at 1131. 
146. The court cited ''the commentators" for the proposition that there were four factors to 
consider, including reliance and purpose. The other two factors identified were "the degree of 
finality of plaintifi's transaction" and "the element of surprise." I d. at 1132. Presumably the 
degree of finality factor is drawn from the effect factor the Supreme Court articulated in Stovall, 
see supra note 11 and accompanying text, but the concept might not take into account all that has 
been included in consideration of effect. See infra notes 206-15 and accompanying text. The 
element of surprise factor appears to be little more than mere surplus, as the concept would seem 
to be included in the notion of "reliance." 
147. 554 F.2d at 1132. 
148. "[The Fifth Circuit case] was a case of first impression, and since the FCC had notice 
almost from the time it adopted the schedule that it would be subject to challenge in court, there 
could be no justifiable reliance here; and indeed, the record demonstrates that there was none." 
Id 
149. 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981). 
150. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § lO{b), 15 U.S. C.§ 78j(b) (1976); Securities Act of 1933 
§ 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). 
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court held that the reliance factor was "the first, and most fundamental fac-
tor," lSI and that the plaintiffs were entitled to rely upon the law as it stood 
when they filed their suit. To clinch the decision, the court concluded that 
even if the purpose factor "suggests retroactive application . . . we think it 
outweighed by the first and third criteria, which overwhelmingly dictate that 
the decision be applied prospectively here." 1s2 Somewhat more tersely, the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion: "The 
first factor for consideration [reliance] is decisive." 1S3 
Puzzling as such language may be, the apparently casual words of both 
circuits contain a clue that may explain how the two courts departed from the 
path marked by the Supreme Court-if indeed they actually departed there-
from. Both the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and District of Columbia 
Circuits referred to reliance as the "first" factor in the established retroactivity 
analysis. In fact, reliance was listed in the earliest days of Link/etter/Stova/1 
decisions as the second factor, and purpose was listed first. 1S4 When the 
Supreme Court decided Chevron, however, it inverted the order of the two 
factors, placing reliance first. At the same time, the Court mixed the reliance 
factor into the explicit language that established the novelty prerequisite, 
which had been only implicit in Linkletter .1ss Thus it happened that reliance 
was mixed with an element arguably more fundamental than any of the single 
factors-perhaps with the result of heightening its importance in the analyses 
of some courts diligently attempting to follow the lead of the Supreme Court. 
It is sobering to consider that on such happenstance, rules of law may tum. 
3. The Sources of Purpose 
Question of priority among the Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron factors 
aside, it is settled that a lower court making a determination of retroactivity 
must search for the purpose of the new rule and the impact retroactivity would 
have upon that purpose.1S6 That directive is straightforward, even if it clearly 
leaves wide latitude to argue about the true purpose of any particular rule. 
Lower courts, therefore, have typically been able to examine the purpose of a 
new rule without becoming enmeshed in controversy about the scope or direc-
151. 650 F.2d at 347. q: Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172, 1180 n.47 (D.C. Cir.l979), cert. 
denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
cited a criminal case from the Linkletter line for the proposition that fairness is a factor to be 
weighed only when the purpose of the rule in question does not clearly favor prospectivity or 
retroactivity. Although Judge Robinson sat on the panels of both Wachovia, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980) and Zweibon, there is no mention of Zweibon in the later decision. 
152. 650 F.2d at 348. 
153. Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1294 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 
943 (1976). 
154. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). 
155. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) ("First, the decision to be applied 
nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent 
on which litigants may have relied ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolu-
tion was not clearly foreshadowed"). 
156. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07; Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. See a/so Hankerson v. North 
Carolina, 233, 432 U.S. 241-43 (1977). 
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tion of their inquiry. An absence of controversy, however, does not preclude 
the possibility that a court has searched too far or in the wrong direction. The 
circumstance under which such misdirection may occur arises when a law-
changing judicial decision affects a statute, either by changing its interpreta-
tion or by striking some portion of the statute as unconstitutional. In that 
situation courts are inclined to look beyond the purpose of the law-changing 
decision and to the purpose of the underlying statute. Whether such an inves-
tigation is authorized is unclear. Linkleller spoke of ''weigh[ing] the merits 
and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in ques-
tion, its purpose and effect."157 The Court did not consider what constituted 
"prior history" of the rule, for inLinkleller it was common knowledge that the 
exclusionary rule had a long history that was clearly relevant to the retroactiv-
ity analysis. Chevron, by contrast, spoke only of the purpose of the new 
rule.1ss 
Whether or not an expansive approach to examining the purpose factor is 
in fact authorized, it undeniably may affect the outcome of retroactivity analy-
sis. Often the effect will be beneficial. In Travis v. Trust Company Bank, !59 for 
example, plaintiff had sued under the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 160 and 
alleged that defendant had failed to disclose the assignment of a security inter-
est as required by legislation. Initially, the pivotal question was whether the 
item assigned was a security interest. While the case was pending at trial, 
however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in a separate case 
that the item at issue was indeed a security interest. 161 The focus of Travis 
therefore became the retroactivity of the intervening decision. 
When the Fifth Circuit made its retroactivity analysis under Chevron, it 
examined the purpose of the federal legislation, not the intervening decision. 
The purpose of the statute in Travis, the panel explained, included an attempt 
to deter sharp lending practices and generally to ensure that lenders did not 
take unfair advantage of debtors. Moreover, the court noted, exceptions to the 
lender's disclosure obligations were to be strictly construed. The court there-
fore concluded that the purpose factor of the Chevron analysis weighed in 
favor of retroactivity, and decided in favor of retroactive application.t62 
While Travis may demonstrate how readily the purpose factor may lead a 
court to debatable conclusions, 163 it also shows how an examination of the 
purpose of a statute relevant to the law-changing decision may be helpful to 
157. Linkleller, 381 U.S. at 629. United States v. Johnson makes reference only to the purpose 
of the new rule. 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2594 n.21 (1982). 
158. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 107-08. 
159. 621 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1980). 
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691(!) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
161. Elzea v. National Bank, 570 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1978). 
162. 621 F.2d at 150-51. 
163. One might wonder, for example, why this civil case might not be a suitable subject for the 
application of the then-popular principle that when deterrence is an intended purpose, prospec-
tivity is appropriate more often than not. q: United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1975). 
Moreover, the reference by the court to its obligation to construe strictly exceptions to the Truth in 
Lending Act would seem more relevant to the scope of the statute than to the "purpose" factor of 
a retroactivity analysis. 
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retroactivity analysis. For if the panel deciding Travis had looked only to the 
purpose of the law-changing decision itself, successful analysis might have 
been frustrated: the relevant portion of the law-changing decision turned 
wholly on that court's view of the language of the statute and a related regula-
tion, without consideration of any policy that might have been considered a 
purpose under the Chevron doctrine.164 Without examining the underlying 
statute, therefore, the court might have been unable to single out any purpose, 
a result that would have made an important part of the retroactivity analysis a 
sterile exercise.165 
Other decisions suggest that examinations of the purpose of something 
other than the law-changing decision may at times be less benign. In Crumpler 
v. Cal(fano, 166 for example, the plaintiff sought retroactivity for a Supreme 
Court decision striking as unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security 
Act providing benefits to surviving widows with children, but not to similarly 
situated widowers.167 The statute violated the fifth amendment right to equal 
protection, the Supreme Court concluded, because by refusing to provide 
equal benefits to widowers, who might then be able to remain at home and 
care for their children, the provision reduced incentives and protections for 
women who might want to enter the workforce.I6s 
Deciding in favor of retroactivity for that Supreme Court decision, the 
federal district court in Crumpler looked to the purpose of the Social Security 
Act. The legislation, the court concluded, was intended to make possible 
closer supervision of children in certain one-parent families, and retroactivity 
would serve that purpose.169 Lost in the analysis was the question how the 
purpose of the fifth amendment-the real basis for the decision of the 
Supreme Court-would be served by retroactivity. It may have been that the 
result in Crumpler would have been the same had the court examined the pur-
pose of the fifth amendment as the Supreme Court had presented it, but that 
result is far from certain. What seems clearer is that the lack of a better de-
fined boundary for investigations of the purpose factor has left the lower 
courts in some disarray, a situation that created the possibility of glaringly 
different resul~r, even less desirable, results based upon the use of which-
ever source of purpose suits the predisposition of a particular judge in a partie-
164. See Elzea v. National Bank, 570 F.2d 1248, 1249-50 (5th Cir. 1978). 
165. Two other cases involving the Truth in Lending Act also used the purpose of the statute, 
rather than of the law-changing decision, for their retroactivity analysis. Valencia v. Anderson 
Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1290 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 205 (1981); 
Brown v. Term plan, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 160, 162-63 (N.D. Ga. 1978). Another decision in which an 
examination of the underlying statute seemed to be beneficial was United States v. LePatourel, 
593 F.2d 827,831-32 (8th Cir. 1979)·(statute of limitations for Federal Tort Claims Act). See also 
Rudolph v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 586 F.2d 90,94 (8th Cir. 1978) (examination of purpose of Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 led to result that examination of law-changing decision would arguably have 
reached), cerl. denied, 441 U.S. 924 (1979); Krilich v. United States, 502 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 
1974) (examination of underlying policy of res judicata), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975). 
166. 443 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Va. 1978). 
167. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
168. /d. at 645. 
169. 443 F. Supp. at 345-46. 
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ular case.170 
170. The only Social Security Act case identified in the course of this survey that lays heavier 
emphasis upon the law-changing decision than upon the statute is Cash v. Califano, 469 F. Supp. 
129 (W.D. Va. 1979), ojf'd, 621 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1980). The court observed, "ln any case, 
retroactive application would serve the purpose of replacement of pecuniary advantage as contem· 
plated by the statute. More importantly, retroactive application would best serve the Goldfarb 
purpose of according 'equal value' to past contributions of female wage earners." /d. at 134. 
Affirming that decision, Judge Haynsworth demonstrated similar insight into the distinction be· 
tween the purpose of the judicial decision and the purpose of the statute: 
The rule at issue here is the equal protection of female wage earners. Unlike the situa-
tion in Linkletter, where the rule was designed to implement a policy, here the rule and 
the policy are one . Retroactivity would simply insure that money paid into Social Se-
curity by a female wage earner would be available to her surviving spouse on the same 
terms as money earned and paid by a male wage earner is available to his spouse. The 
time of protection is expanded. In fact, like the situation presented in Cathedral Acad-
emy, nometroactivity would retard application of the rule by permitting the Secretary to 
continue to violate constitutional rights mandated by the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
626 F.2d at 631. More typical of retroactivity decisions involving portions of the Social Security 
Act are Jimenez v. Weinoerger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975) (purpose of statute was to support 
dependents, who need to have other sources of funds replenished), cerl. denied, 427 U.S. 912 
{1976); Novak v. Harris, 504 F. Supp. 101, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1980): 
The court finds that retroactivity would promote the legislative intent behind enactment 
of [the statute) and the purpose of [the law-changing decision]. Specifically, it would 
further the goal that funds paid into Social Security by a female wage earner should be 
available to her surviving spouse on the same terms as money earned and paid by a male 
wage earner. 
See also Aznavorian v. Califano, 440 F. Supp. 788 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (purpose of Social Security 
Act is to benefit needy people}, rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 170 (1978). Jenkins v. United 
States Civil Serv. Co='n. 460 F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1978), took the same approach when exam-
ining the retroactivity of judicial decisions related to the Civil Service Survivor Annuities Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 834l(a){3){A)(ii) (1976): "[Retroactivity] will further the purposes of the survivor annu-
ity law by giving support to dependents and by extending 'benefits to surviving memebers of the 
i=ediate family of the annuitant, without regard to dependency.'" /d. at 613 (quoting Gentry 
v. United States, 546 F.2d 343, 353 (Ct. Cl. 1976)). 
In all those cases the choice of purposes to be examined by each individual court may have 
been harmless to the result, or even beneficial. In other cases, however, an examination of the 
purpose of the statute may have led the court away from a diverging purpose behind the law-
changing decision. See Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35, 41 (E.D. Va. 1976), ajf'd, 
579 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1978) (interpretation of statute of limitations for Title VII of 1964 Civil 
Rights Act not retroactive, partly because "Title VII evinces a strong policy in favor of airing 
employment discrimination grievances"), cerl. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979); Hines v. Olinkraft, 
Inc., 413 F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (W.D. La. 1976) (purpose factor may support prospectivity because 
retroactivity ofinterpretation of statute of limitations ''would not further the broad remedial poli· 
cies of§ 1981"). Such use of the purpose behind statues, rather than the often narrow purpose 
behind a judicial decision affecting portions of a statute, suggest that decisions relating to enact· 
ments such as Title VII or§ 1981 would almost never be retroactive. 
Even more obvious cases demonstrate how easily a court can err when it strays too far from 
the purpose of the law-changing decision. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. FEA, 463 F. Supp. 1079 (N.D. 
Cal. 1979), involved a suit by a company to force an agency to modify an order the agency had 
issued. The order, which would have forced the company to make repayments to a gasoline sta· 
tion operator for overcharges on rent, was issued under the authority of the Emergency Petroleum 
Allocation Act, IS U.S. C.§§ 751-760h (1976 & Supp. V 1981}, which gave the agency such author-
ity to control oil-related prices as existed pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1904 (1976). Subsequent to the order of the agency, the Temporary Emergency Court of Ap-
peals held that once the Economic Stabilization Act had expired, the agency had no authority to 
ISsue the type of order in dispute in the instant case. Shell Oil Co. v. FEA, 527 F.2d 1243 (Temp. 
Emer. Ct. App. 1975). Because the Economic Stabilization Act had expired before the agency 
issued the order, the agency sought prospectivity for Shell Oil. Arguably the law-changing case 
should have been treated as a matter of jurisdiction, which might have received automatic retroac-
tivity, see infra notes 266-85 and accompanying text, but instead the court made a Chevron analy· 
sis. Reasoning that a purpose of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act was to preserve the 
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4. Bases for Reliance 
Of the three factors characteristic of both theLinkletter/Stova/1 and Chev-
ron analyses, the one that perhaps stirs the greatest empathy is reliance. Prej-
udicing someone who relied upon existing rules through retroactive 
application of a change in those rules simply seems unfair, so it should come 
as no surprise that reliance has a lengthy history as a factor supporting pro-
spective application of a new rule. 171 There must, of course, have been actual 
reliance before the factor can weigh in favor of prospectivity. Federal courts 
have treated as fundamental the notion that a party seeking relief from retro-
activity must demonstrate that he actually depended upon the existing state of 
the law-that he took some action, or refrained from taking some action, in 
compliance with what he believed the law to be at the time he acted. In Of 
Course, Inc. v. Commissioner,112 a corporate taxpayer was unable to resist ret-
roactivity for an unfavorable new rule when it was "plain that the taxpayer 
was not influenced in any action taken by [the old rule]. Its decision to liqui-
date and the procedure followed would have been the same whether [the old 
rule] prevailed or not." 173 Similarly, in Aiello v. City of Wi!mington, 114 a mu-
nicipality argued against retroactivity for a law-changing decision on the 
ground that the new law, subjecting cities to legal as well as equitable remedies 
for civil rights violations, was a dramatic departure from precedent. The court 
rejected the argument, partly because the city was unable to show that "the 
earlier decision established a rule of substantive conduct on which the munici-
competitive viability of small operators in various segments of the petroleum industry, the court 
held that retroactive application of Shell Oil would not serve that purpose. 463 F. Supp. at 1083. 
What the court ignored was that once the Economic Stabilization Act had expired, the Emergency 
Petroleum Allocation Act simply had no bearing on the issue of rents. In essence, the court had 
referred to the purpose of a statute which was, in the very nature of the law-changing decision, 
utterly irrelevant to the retroactivity analysis. 
An analogue to the Atlantic Ric4fteld decision is Bush v. Wood Bros. Transfer, Inc., 398 F. 
Supp. 1030 (S.D. Tex. 1975), in which a district court looked not to the purpose of the statute at 
issue, but to the purpose of the old, now overturned, case law that had construed the statute: 
The second criterion concerns the nature and operation of the past rule that is in ques-
tion. The rule here was that during the pendency of an EEOC investigation, the § 1981 
statute of limitations is tolled. The purpose of this rule was to implement the policy of 
encouraging plaintiffs to use every avenue of relief prior to instituting a civil suit. In 
Johnson, the Supreme Court has apparently come to the realization that the theory of 
the old rule does not operate in practice, however, [sic] there are presently numerous 
litigants who relied on the rule and refrained from instituting theoretically premature 
§ 1981 actions prior to the conclusion of an EEOC proceeding. Thus, it is the opinion of 
this Court that the second criterion is also met inasmuch as the prior rule is presently in 
operation in the form of pending Title VII and§ 198llitigation and nonjudicial EEOC 
proceedings. The rule served a positive function which would be destroyed by the retro-
active application of Johnson. 
Jd. at 1032-33. The melange of reliance and purpose aside, the court simply failed to comprehend 
how far afield it had gone-perhaps in part because the path was so poorly marked. 
171. Even before Linkletter, reliance upon an establi$ed rule, or the possibility of unfair sur-
prise, was identified as a factor that should operate in favor of prospective application of a new 
rule. See Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 Yale 
LJ. 907, 944-50 (1962), and cases cited therein. 
172. 499 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1974) (en bane). 
173. /d. at 759-60. 
174. 470 F. Supp. 414 (D. Del. 1979), a.f!'d, 623 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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pality relied."17S 
At first glance it might seem that actual reliance should also incorporate 
the notion of good-faith reliance-that is, the sort of reasonable conduct citi-
zens should be able to expect from one another. In fact, however, the Supreme 
Court has not always insisted upon that requirement. Particularly in the area 
of search and seizure, evidence obtained through unlawful conduct by law 
enforcement authorities has routinely escaped retroactive application of the 
exclusionary rule, because the police acted in reliance upon the nonapplicabil-
ity of that rule. Any other approach would have reversed the result in Linklet-
ter itself, making that decision retroactive. Justice Rehnquist may have best 
explained the reason for the absence of a good-faith requirement in search and 
seizure cases when he noted that "although the police in [two retroactivity 
cases involving unlawful searches] could not have been expected to foresee the 
application of the exclusionary rule to state criminal trials, they could reason-
ably have entertained no similar doubts as to the illegality of their 
conduct."176 
Lower federal courts have followed the lead of the Supreme Court in 
search and seizure cases,177 but in other areas an absence of good faith seems 
to count heavily against a plea for prospectivity. In McKinnon v. Patterson, 178 
for example, convicts brought a civil rights action against prison officials for 
punishing the convicts without a sufficient hearing. The cause of action rested 
upon an appellate court opinion subsequently overruled by Supreme Court 
decisions, putting the prisoners in the anomalous position- for convictsi79_ 
of pleading for nonretroactivity for a law-changing decision. Both plaintiffs 
and defendants apparently believed that their respective sides of the case met 
the relevant tests of the old rule, but it was to the convicts that the judge di-
rected a telling remark: "Plaintiffs rely upon the prior case law to obtain re-
dress for past actions taken against them; plaintiffs do not allege that their 
own actions were authorized by the prior law."Iso 
175. Id. at 418. Accord In re Spell, 650 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1981) (neither party able to demon· 
strate reliance on old rule); United States v. Marshall, 471 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam) 
(Bazelon, CJ., dissenting)(no prospectivity when prosecution did not rely upon old rule). 
176. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538 (1975). 
177. See, e.g., United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. 
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975)); United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236 (6th Cir.), cerl. denied sub 
110m. Kaye v. United States, 444 U.S. 991 (1979) (same). 
178. 425 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), mod!fied on other grounds, 568 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978). 
179. Criminal defendants are constitutionally protected against retroactive application of law-
changing decisions adverse to the defendants' interests. See supra note 20. Normally, therefore, 
criminal defendants and convicts raise retroactivity issues by pleading for retroactive application 
of decisions favorable to them. 
180. 425 F. Supp. at 388. See also Brown v. Termplan, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1978), 
in which a lender failed to make certain disclosures in the belief that the law did not oblige hini to 
do so. Subsequently the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that such disclosure must be 
made, Elzea v. National Bank, 570 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1978), and the issue was the retroactivity of 
that holding. Refusing the lender's plea for prospectivity, the court co=ented, "A creditor 
should evaluate its credit terms so as to come within the spirit of the law as well as its letter. 
Otherwise, as here, the creditor may find himself outside of both." 459 F. Supp. at 163 (footnote 
omitted). Courts also seem to require that good faith continue for the entire penod during which a 
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The issue of good faith aside, parties have shown impressive imagination 
in proposing variations upon which the reliance factor could rest. With vary-
ing degrees of success, they have offered prior judicial decisions, legislation, 
regulations, industry practice, and even the absence of standards by which 
conduct could be measured as foundations for reliance. As might be expected, 
reliance upon case law seems to have worked best. 
Parties may choose the safest ground of all when citing prior Supreme 
Court decisions.181 The lower courts are also inclined to consider favorably 
reliance based upon lesser judicial decisions, 182 an approach the Supreme 
Court has recently sanctioned.183 The Supreme Court, however, seems to 
countenance a substantial body of decisions, preferably from the federal courts 
of appeals, in which "virtual unanimity" was achieved, 184 while the lower 
courts for many years have been content with considerably less persuasive pre-
cedent. In an appropriate circumstance, a lower court has let a single federal 
case serve as sufficient foundation for reliance, 185 and state decisons have also 
satisfied the requirement. 186 The lower courts are divided upon the appropri-
ateness of reliance based upon authority subject to significant judicial dispute, 
or even scholarly criticism, 187 but it seems settled that reliance cannot be 
party relied. See Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064, 1073-74 (2d Cir. 1977) (no 
good faith reliance when a party's actions, arguably in good faith at one time, were later condi-
tioned more by inertia than good faith). 
181. See Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 156 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Whether [a 1950 
Supreme Court case] was 'clear past precedent' to the Supreme Court in 1971, the unqualified 
pronouncement in that case undoubtedly made the doctrine clear enough to parties relying upon it 
from 1950 to 1971."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973). 
182. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342 
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (reliance upon circuit court decisions), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Brown v. 
Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Walker, 569 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 
1978) (same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978); Williams v. Phil Rich Fan Mfg. Co., 552 F.2d 596 
(5th Cir. 1977) (same); Krilich v. United States, 502 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied, 
420 u.s. 992 (1975). 
183. See United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2589 n.l5 (1982). See also supra note 87. 
184. See United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2589 n.l5 (1982). 
185. United States v. Dorszynski, 524 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 
(1976) (prior decision in District of Columbia Circuit was only appellate authority on point at time 
of reliance). 
186. See Martin v. Wyrick, 568 F.2d 583 (8th Cir.) (reliance upon line of state court decisions), 
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 975 (1978). In Litwhiler v. Hidlay, 429 F. Supp. 984 (M.D. Pa. 1977), the 
court noted, "The fact that three dissenters in [the Pennsylvania Supreme Comt case upholding 
patronage firings] argued for a position similar to the one which ultimately prevailed [in the law-
changing United States Supreme Court case], does not render the Defendants' reliance on the 
majority view of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonable." /d. at 986. 
187. See, e.g., Aufiero v. Clarke, 639 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.) (valid reliance upon "nearly unani-
mous" prior case law), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981); Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 
1978) (valid reliance upon Fourth Circuit decision although Seventh Circuit had taken contrary 
position), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979) . .But see Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 792 (2d 
Cir. 1981). Prior toHolzsager the Second Circuit had upheld the constitutionality of New York's 
assertion of jurisdiction over parties pursuant to the doctrine of Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 
N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). More importantly, the Second Circuit had upheld Seider 
jurisdiction even after the Supreme Court had delivered the important and related decision in 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978). Nevertheless, after the Supreme Court overruled the 
Seider doctrine, the Second Circuit refused to make the new rule prospective, partly because "the 
volume of criticism of the Seider rule made the prospect of its continuing validity questionable." 
646 F.2d at 797. 
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based upon a minority line of authority. 18B 
A troubling question raised by one circuit is whether a court may examine 
the quality of reasoning in the cases upon which a party places his reliance. In 
White v. Maggio, 189 a state convict sought habeas corpus relief on the ground 
that his criminal trial had been tainted by the refusal of the state to let defend-
ant's ballistics expert examine two bullets that were important evidence at 
trial. After the defendant had been convicted, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held in an unrelated case190 that such a denial of access to evi-
dence was unlawful. The state pleaded for prospectivity on the ground that it 
had relied upon state decisions that had clearly approved the practice. The 
Fifth Circuit agreed that the line of authority had been undisputed, but still 
held for retroactivity. The reliance by the state, the court reasoned, was not 
particularly strong because other state decisions had endorsed pretrial inspec-
tions of such evidence as narcotics and weapons. 191 Thus a party's reliance 
was denied consideration because the party should not have relied upon a 
fairly settled body of law that was to the party's advantage but was, with the 
benefit of hindsight, not as well reasoned as the Fifth Circuit would have 
preferred. 
In most circumstances a party may rely upon a statute or a regulation 
with as much confidence as upon case law. In United States v. Peltier 192 the 
Supreme Court found a satisfactory basis for reliance in "a validly enacted 
[federal] statute, supported by longstanding administrative regulation."193 
That holding would seem to have settled the matter, at least as far as federal 
statutes and regulations are concerned. 194 Even earlier, the Supreme Court 
had struggled with a case in which plaintiffs sought recovery of payments 
made to sectarian schools for educational services rendered pursuant to a state 
statute that was subsequently declared unconstitutionai.19S Although the 
holding in that cased focused more upon "the appropriate scope of federal 
188. Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980) (party's reliance upon 
one prior district court decision insufficient when two other prior district court decisions reached a 
contrary result), rev'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 205 (1981); Benedict Oil Co. v. United States, 582 
F.2d 544 (lOth Cir. 1978) (en bane) (no valid reliance upon Fourth Circuit decision when two 
other circuits and relevant IRS regulations reached a contrary result). An evenly split body of 
authority also may fail to provide a sufficient basis for reliance. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 
1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (split of authority plus parties' awareness that Supreme Court is generally 
unfriendly toward the sort of acts undertaken undercuts assertion of reliance), cert. denied, 453 
U.S. 912 (1981); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 {7th Cir.) (no valid reliance when two 
other circuits have reached contradictory results}, cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972). 
189. 556 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1977). 
190. Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975). 
191. 556 F.2d at 1356. 
192. 422 u.s. 531 (1975). 
193. Id. at 541. 
194. See United States v. Main, 598 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.) (reliance upon federal tax code and 
IRS manual), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979); Bailey v. Holley, 530 F.2d 169 (7th Cir.) (parole 
board regulations}, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845 (1976); Bergstrom v. Kissinger, 387 F. Supp. 794 
(D.D.C. 1974) (regulation governing "selection-out" process for federal employees), ajjd, 530 
F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
195. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973). 
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equitable remedies" than upon principles of retroactivity, 196 the Supreme 
Court also noted that the schools had incurred expenses in reasonable reliance 
upon the statute, making retroactivity inappropriate. Most lower courts have 
followed that direction and have found sufficient reliance upon a variety of 
state statutes. 197 
One interesting case against that tide is probably no longer good law, but 
it raises an important point nonetheless. Alexander v. Weaver 198 addressed the 
retroactivity of a Supreme Court decision that held unconstitutional a state 
statute restricting the eligibility of certain categories of persons for Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children.199 As part of their opposition to retroac-
tive application of the Supreme Court decision, state officials argued that they 
had relied upon the state statute for direction -indeed, they were bound by it. 
The federal court demonstrated little sympathy, however, characterizing the 
state's statutory overlay to federal legislation as self-serving. The court re-
fused the plea for prospectivity and reasoned: 
To permit this reliance as a defense against retroactive payments 
would allow any state to promulgate a statute of dubious constitu-
tionality limiting the funds it must expend at the minimal risk of a 
subsequent finding of unconstitutionality (if indeed it is challenged) 
which finding would come only some time later after the case had 
gone the judicial route and which would deny retroactive relief thus 
giving the state the desired effect and savings at least during the pe-
riod of its existence.200 
It is probably not necessary to adopt this jaundiced view of state legisla-
tive processes to agree that there might be special considerations regarding 
reliance upon a rule by a party who influenced the development of that rule. 
But as soon as agreement is reached upon that point, it becomes clear that 
such a concern can easily be taken too far. Public agencies, in particular, are 
often properly influential in the enactment of legislation they will enforce, and 
it does not seem consistent with the public interest to discourage their contri-
butions to the legislative process by threatening them with deprivation of the 
right to rely upon rules they helped develop.201 If Alexander is no longer law, 
then the point may be moot. A key question still remains, however: if we 
assume that reliance by a party who helped write the rule can sometimes be 
196. /d. at 199. 
197. See, e.g., Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978) (statute sanctioning patronage 
appointments of deputy sheriffs), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979); Kacher v. Pittsburgh Nat'! 
Bank, 545 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1976) (replevin statute); Pruett v. Texas, 470 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir.) (en 
bane) (sentencing statute), qff'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F. 
Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court) (statute authorizing aid to sectarian colleges), qff'd, 
426 u.s. 736 (1976). 
198. 345 F. Supp. 666 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 914 
(1973). The result in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), see supra notes 195-96 and accom-
p~nying text, probably rendered Alexander devoid of precedential value. 
199. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971). 
200. 345 F. Supp. at 673. 
201. See Americans United For Separation of Church & State v. Board ofEduc., 369 F. Supp. 
1059 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (public agencies must rely upon law they administer and normally cannot 
obtain prior approval of their work from a court). 
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insufficient as a defense against retroactivity, the issue of where to draw the 
line remains unaddressed. 
The last source from which reliance might be drawn may be described as 
any practice that does not rise to the level of a formally adopted statute, judi-
cial decision, or administrative regulation. The likelihood that such a founda-
tion for reliance will be accepted by a court is uncertain. The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, has held that an industry custom is 
an insufficient basis for reliance.202 In Weinburg v. Mitche/1,203 however, in 
which defendants in a civil suit sought prospectivity for a holding that the 
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment permitted no exception for 
warrantless wiretaps,204 the same circuit reached a different result. "There 
may not have been any judicial authority for the warrantless wiretaps, but the 
executive branch had long proceeded on the assumption that surveillance ex-
ercised in the interest of national security was within its power."2os 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also produced apparently 
inconsistent results. After a panel overturned a state practice of requiring in-
carcerated criminal defendants to wear prison garb at their trials, the court 
rejected the plea by the state for prospectivity. Although the state noted that 
the practice in question was an old one, free of prior judicial criticism or 
praise, the court responded magisterially, "Reliance on a blank slate is not 
enough."206 By contrast, consider.Basse/1 v. Smith,2°7 in which a state pris-
oner sought habeas corpus relief because a jury instruction used in his trial 
was subsequently held to violate due process. The state sought prospectivity 
partly upon the ground that it had used the instruction in good faith for many 
years, and this time the Fifth Circuit accepted the argument: 
The State's reliance was concededly not founded upon any Supreme 
Court decision sustaining the Georgia or similar charges against a 
due process attack. Neverthless, the very absence of any action on 
the part of the federal courts condemning this nearly century-old 
practice of the Georgia courts prior to [the date of the law-changing 
decision] inevitably gave rise to the implication that the practice did 
202. American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975). 
203. 588 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1978). The Weinberg opinion makes no mention of American 
Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 
(1975), discussed supra text accompanying note 202. 
204. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
205. 588 F.2d at 277. Note that both American Timber and Weinberg were civil actions for 
damages. The cases seem to be distinguishable, if at all, upon the basis that in Weinberg defend-
ants were former government officials who might be presumed to have been acting for the public 
good, rather than private gain. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en 
bane), rev'd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), in which Judge Wilkey, dissenting, su~gested 
that a party should be able to rely upon a legal scholar's view of a Supreme Court deciston. 
206. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 501 
(1976). 
207. 464 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973). Judge Ainsworth, who 
wrote the opinion of the court in Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), discussed supra 
text accompanying note 206, cited Basset with the parenthetical "but see." 
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not offend the Constitution.208 
Finally, three circuits, among them the Fifth Circuit, have recently ad-
dressed the retroactivity of United States v. Mauro,2°9 in which the Supreme 
Court held that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act2IO required certain 
procedural protections for criminal defendants who were moved around the 
country for criminal prosecution. All three circuits concluded that Mauro 
should not be accorded retroactivity, partly because prosecutors were entitled 
to rely upon what the Third Circuit called "the unsettled state of the law prior 
to Mauro ."211 
5. Equity Breeds Success 
The third factor of Linkletter/Stoval/ and Chevron is usually described 
either as a consideration of the equities, or the effect of retroactivity upon the 
administration ofjustice.212 Although there are decisions in which this factor 
has received cursory213 or confused214 treatment, on the whole the analysis of 
208. 464 F.2d at 351. The panel noted, however, that "[t]he Georgia charge was never an 
object of scholarly or judicial praise." I d. at 352. q. Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 792, 
797 (2d Cir. 1981) (no valid reliance upon old rule that had been heavily criticized). 
209. 436 u.s. 340 (1978). 
210. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-8 (1976). 
211. United States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 593 (3d Cir. 1980). Accord United States v. Hill, 
622 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1980); Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979). The panel in Hill 
was entirely different from the panel in Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974). Wil-
liams, which had been reversed by the Supreme Court on other grounds, was not cited in Hill. 
212. In Linkletter the court pondered the implications of retroactivity for the judicial system. 
381 U.S. at 637. In Chevron the court described the third factor as "the inequity imposed by 
retroactive application." 404 U.S. at 107. 
213. See, e.g., Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1290 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd on 
other grounds, 452 U.S. 205 (1981): 
we note that defendants have failed to persuade us that retroactive application of our 
ruling will retard the operation of the [Truth in Lending Act] or cause undue hardship. 
The Act requires disclosure of security interests as defined by Regulation Z. Our ruling 
merely implements that requirement. It does not disturb any clear rulings or precedents 
on which defendants may have relied to their detriment. We can see no inequity in its 
retroactive application. 
See also Matter of S/S Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 754 (5th Cir. 1976) ("a holding of retroactivity 
would not 'produce substantial inequitable results' in this case. It seems unlikely, for example, 
that the parties' conduct leading to the Helena-White Alder collision was in any way influenced 
by the pre-Reliable Transfer divided damages rule"); Radcliff v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 1093, 1096 
(lOth Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 939 (1975) (''We believe that the principles of 'basic fair-
ness' mentioned in Robinson and 'essential justice' mentioned in Gosa require that the Lamb 
decision be applied retroactively"). 
214. The list of cases in which the courts seem to have misconstrued the third factor is short, 
though some of the co=ents are rather stark. Jenkins v. United States Civil Serv. Co='n, 460 
F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1978), was a class action for retroactive application of 1m earlier decision 
holding unconstitutional a federal statute requiring illegitimate children applying for Civil Service 
Survivor Annuities to show they had lived with the Civil Service parent. Addressing the third 
factor, the court said, "Furthermore, the equities weigh in favor of retroactive application in that 
the unconstitutional deprivation of benefits to the members of the class would otherwise go on-
remedied." I d. at 613. How that situation was more severe than Linkleller, in which persons 
denied a constitutional right remained in jail, is not clear. 
The other particularly troubling case in this area is Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. 
Supp. 35 (E.D. Va. 1976), ajj'd, 579 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979), in 
which an employee who was fired brought a grievance to a labor arbitration process but delayed 
making a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The employee believed 
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this factor has produced a fairly consistent body of judicial opinion. The effect 
factor usually has weighed in favor of retroactivity if the court is unable to 
identify a consequence that is either fundamentally unfair215 or otherwise 
laden with real-world implications for the operation of administrative or judi-
cial bodies. Novak v. Harris216 is representative of a number of district court 
cases in which pragmatic considerations influenced the result. The issue in 
Novak was whether a widower not dependent upon his deceased spouse was 
entitled to retroactive application of Cal!fano v. Goldfarb,211 in which the 
Supreme Court had held that the Social Security Act's dependency require-
ment for widowers was unconstitutional. The district court decided in favor of 
retroactivity for Goldfarb: 
Two significant points militate against nonretroactive application of 
Goldfarb. Specifically, this court is not dealing with a class of wid-
owers; the court is concerned solely with a single claimant whose 
claim was pending at the time of the decision in Goldfarb. Although 
consideration should be given to the potential impact of granting ret-
roactive effect in the present case, this court is cognizant of the con-
crete individual rights of the plaintiff, Harry Novak. Second, in 
measuring the hardships suffered by each party, the court initially 
must be satisfied that retroactive payment would produce substantial 
inequitable results. This court cannot conclude that an award of ret-
roactive benefits to one person, for a period of some two and one-half 
years, would have any significant impact upon the fiscal integrity of 
the Social Security system. Indeed, it would be inequitable for Mr. 
Novak to be denied his right to widowers' benefits for a limited pe-
riod of time because, during that period, there existed an unconstitu-
tional gender-based requirement.218 
Mr. Novak was fortunate that his lawyer did not bring a class action.219 Aside 
that the statute of limitations for such a complaint was tolled pending the outcome of arbitration, 
but subsequently the rule was established that arbitration did not toll the statute. The court ap-
plied the new rule prospectively because "Title VII evinces a strong policy in favor of airing 
employment discrimination grievances." Id. at 41. 
215. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
894 (1981), in which the Board promulgated a new rule providing back pay for unlawfully dis-
charged striking employees who had not asked for reinstatement to their jobs. Holding in favor of 
retroactivity, the court said: 
retroactive application will not create substantial injustice or undue hardship for either 
party. The Board finds no valid reason for distinguishing between the status of an un-
lawfully discharged striker and of an unlawfully discharged working employee. Con-
trary to the Company's claim, the rule enforced here does not provide a windfall to 
striking employees but merely places the burden of undoing the wrong on the wrong-
doer, where it seems properly to belong. 
Id. at 757. Accord Haney v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 498 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (new rule 
requiring exhaustion of arbitration remedy; retroactivity appropriate because court will ensure 
that in subsequent litigation defendant will not raise defense of laches). 
216. 504 F. Supp. 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
217. 430 u.s. 199 (1977). 
218. 504 F. Supp. at 106-07 (citations omitted). 
219. Other cases also seem to have taken account of the presence or absence of a class in 
mald!tg a decision on retroactivity. Shannon v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 444 F. Supp. 
354 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (class relief available only to extent of readily retrievable records or when 
individual parties made requests on their own initiative), mod!fied on other grounds, 621 F.2d 1030 
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from that pragmatic consideration, the decision in Novak is interesting for its 
use of an extension of the original Linkletter/Chevron line of thought. While 
the Supreme Court used those decisions to evaluate the burden retroactivity 
might impose upon the administration of justice in the courts, Novak and sim-
ilar cases address the potential administrative impact of retroactivity.220 
Beyond those wrinkles, the effect factor seems to be one over which the 
courts have exercised considerable discretion. In this area, civil and criminal 
cases alike evince a thoughtful, measured appr~ach to the issue, producing 
decisions the analysis and results of which are difficult to criticize.221 Equity, 
or basic fairness--wncepts American courts encountered long before Linklet-
ter-has produced consistent and reasonable results. 
6. Differences Between Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron 
As the Supreme Court recently made clear, it considers the Chevron anal-
ysis to be distinct, applicable uniquely to civillitigation.222 It remains true, 
however, that Chevron developed in the wake of Linkletter/Stovall and ap-
pears to have borrowed heavily from the earlier doctrine.223 Those circum-
stances may help explain why, over the past decade, lower courts have been 
considerably less clear in differentiating Chevron fromLinkletter/Stovall, and 
when distinctions have been drawn, they may explain why such distinctions 
are not always the same as those the Supreme Court has identified. 
The manner in which the Supreme Court first approached retroactivity in 
civil litigation at least allowed the possibility that the Court contemplated a 
close analogue to the retroactivity analysis emerging from the Linklet-
ter/Stovallline.224 Originally left unstated was how close the relationship was 
(9th Cir. 1980); cf. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975) (retroactivity ordered 
partly because government was unable to show that back payments to class will undermine trust 
fund), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Brown v. United States, 508 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 422 U.S. 1027 (1975); Aznavorian v. Califano, 440 F. Supp. 788 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (same). 
220. But see Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973) (refusing retroactivity for O'Callahan v. 
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), because such a result would produce significant judicial and adminis-
trative costs). 
221. Examples of particularly thoughtful analysis include Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 
792 (2d Cir. 1981) (retroactivity not inequitable because party injured thereby will merely have 
failed to win a gamble on obtaining a more lucrative forum); Aufiero v. Clarke, 639 F.2d 49, 51 
(1st Cir.) (prospectivity, because persons likely to be injured by retroactivity were "blameless"), 
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981); Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir.) (en bane) (retroactiv-
ity would produce an avalanche of reversals), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980); Rudolph v. Wag-
ner Elec. Corp., 586 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1978) (no retroactivity be~use party who thereby loses 
could have prevented situation simply by filing a timely complaint), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 924 
(1979); Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1972) (burden of retroactivity upon state is 
manageable because only 122 persons are affected), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973); United 
States ex ref. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (prisoner seeking expungement of 
records of disciplinary actions taken without due process gets expungement because no great ad-
ministrative burden is involved). 
222. United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2587 n.l2, 2594-95 (1982). 
223. Moreover, the Supreme Court once treated civil and criminal cases as essentially the 
same for retroactivity purposes. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 627 ("no distinction [will 
be] drawn between civil and criminal litigation"). 
224. Until recently, the similarities between Link/etter/Stova/1 and Chevron have always 
seemed more important than the differences. See Beytagh, supra note 11, at 1582. 
782 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
to be and in what circumstances the approaches to civil and criminal retroac-
tivity cases nominally under the broad umbrella of Link/etler/Stova/1-or per-
haps more aptly, Linkleller/Stova/1/Chevron-may begin to diverge. Thus,· 
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit wrote that Chevron was an appro-
priate test for "conventional retroactivity analysis," a term that included many 
criminal cases, but that: 
[in] contrast, when the exclusionary rule is involved, retroactivity 
analysis focuses on whether the purposes underlying the exclusionary 
rule would be furthered by retroactive application. If neither judicial 
integrity nor deterrence of official misconduct would be enhanced by 
retroactive employment of the exclusionary rule, then it will be given 
prospective application only. See United States v. Peltier . ... 225 
Even when courts have agreed that a distinction should be drawn between 
civil and criminal matters, the circuits have been unable to concur among 
themselves as to the consequences such categorization should produce. While 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit commented that Chevron establishes 
a stricter test to be met before a court can decide in favor of prospectivity,226 
the Fourth Circuit concluded that in civil cases considerations of reliance and 
a need for stability in the law weigh in favor of prospectivity.227 Two other 
circuits have joined in the fray. The Seventh Circuit has taken sides with the 
Fifth Circuit by holding that prospectivity will be more nearly preferred in 
criminal cases.228 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
on the other hand, has been more tentative, preferring an approach that seems 
to fall between that of the Fourth Circuit and that of the Tenth: 
Historically, prospectivity has been less common in civil than in 
criminal cases. This is at least partly due to the potential flood of 
habeas copus petitions that looms if a court recognizes retroactively 
a procedural or substantive right of criminal defendants. No such 
threat arises in civil litigation where a retroactive decision can affect 
only suits pending in the courts or not yet brought, but cannot be 
raised by previously unsuccessful litigants. The prospectivity deter-
mination in both civil and criminal cases, however, remains a prag-
matic one that turns on the expected impact of a retroactive 
overruling on the society and legal system. 
[W]e think that a stronger case for prospectivity, rather than retroac-
tivity, might be made in a criminal case involving the exclusionary 
rule, where the prophylactic purpose of that rule cannot be served by 
retroactive application and where the costs to society of retroactivity 
may be far greater. In a damage action the effect of the warrant rule 
articulated in the [law-changing decisions at issue in the case at bar] 
is to recognize a substantive right to compensation for injury. Retro-
225. Savina Home Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1363 (lOth Cir. 1979). 
226. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. SOl 
(1976). 
227. Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978), ~ert. denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979). 
228. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 20 (7th Cir.), cerl. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972). 
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active application would therefore seem fully consonant with those 
decisions . . . . 229 
783 
As it turns out, none of the positions enunciated in any of those decisions 
is the prevalent view, for the largest body of decisions simply treats Linklet-
ter/Stovall and Chevron as essentially the same test. Some decisions make 
that point explicitly,230 but the more common practice is to link the two deci-
sions either by citing Linkletter/Stoval! (or their criminal progeny) in a civil 
context,231 or Chevron in a criminal matter.2~2 Ironically, numbered among 
the circuits treating Linkletter/Stova{l and Chevron as fungible are most of 
those that sought to explain the differences between the doctrines.233 
The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in United States v. Johnson 234 
should end the mixing of Linkletter/Stoval! and Chevron. The confusion over 
the past decade, however, with undetermined implications for affected retroac-
tivity decisions, is itself a most unfortunate result. It would se1~m that either 
the lower courts were unable to follow a clear lead, or that the Supreme Court 
229. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172, 1176-77, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 
U.S. 912 (1981); accord United States ex rei. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 950 (E.D. Pa. 
1973) (Linkletter applies to civil and criminal cases, "but other factors will become relevant be-
cause the effects of civil remedies may differ from criminal remedies"). 
230. Burkhart v. Saxbe, 448 F. Supp. 588, 599 n.22 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (with regard to retroactiv-
ity, "the [Supreme) Court apparently has not distinguished between civil and criminal cases or 
constitutional and nonconstitutional issues in developing this area of jurisprudence"), modified on 
other grounds sub nom. Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 
913 (1981); cf. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 627 (7th Cir. 1973) ("Nor does it matter that 
Miller and this case arise in a civil rather than a criminal context"). 
231. Ruotolo v. Gould, 489 F.2d 1324 (1st Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Roemer v. Board of Pub. 
Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court), o/f'd, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Wood v. 
United States Post Office Dep't, 381 F. Supp. 1371 (N.D. Ill. 1973), o/f'd, 511 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 
1975). 
232. United States v. Blake, 632 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Tucker, 610 F.2d 
1007 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Stewart, 595 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
233. Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1981) (habeas case citing Chevron); United States 
v. Hill, 622 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1980) (criminal appeal citing Chevron); United States v. Petersen, 
611 F.2d 1313 (lOth Cir. 1979) (criminal appeal citing Chevron), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980); 
Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979) (habeas case citing Chevron), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 
916 (1980); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (appeal of 
agency decision citing Linkletter); National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1118 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (appeal of agency decision citing Linkletter); Haney v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 498 
F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (civil appeal citing Linkletter). 
Of interest is the degree of overlap in membership on the panels deciding the cases cited 
supra notes 225-27 and 229, and the apparently contradictory views from the same circuits cited in 
this footnote. Judge Ainsworth of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit wrote the opinions in 
Hattie and Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 501 
(1976), but he did not mention the Williams decision in Bailie. The Supreme Court reversed 
Williams on other grounds, which may explain why it was not cited. 
Both Judges Barrett and McKay sat on the panels of .Petersen and Savina Home Indus. v. 
Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (lOth Cir. 1979). Moreover, Judge Barrett wrote the opinion in 
.Petersen and Judge McKay wrote the opinion in Savina. Nevertheless, .Petersen does not cite 
Savina. 
There is no overlap between the panel that sat for Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), and the panels that sat for National Ass'n of Broad-
casters,Actionfor Children's Television, and Haney. Zweibon, the most recently decided of the 
cases, does not cite any of the others. 
234. See 102 S. Ct. 2579 (1982), discussed supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
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was unable to offer one.235 
B. Alternatives to Linkletter/Stovall and Chevron 
1. Diversity 
[Vol. 61 
In diversity cases, the decision of the Supreme Court in Vandenbark v. 
Owens-Illinois Glass Co. 236 commands the lower courts to treat retroactivity as 
a substantive matter under the Erie doctrine.237 As Vandenbark construes 
Erie, that means the federal courts are to apply the decision of the state 
supreme court prevailing at the time the federal judgment is to be entered, 
resulting in automatic retroactivity in diversity matters.23B 
The investigation made for this article included only a few diversity cases, 
but courts in most of those studied were able to apply the rule of Vandenbark 
routinely.239 A few other cases, mostly in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, raised the only troubling question to come to light: if Vandenbark is 
taken literally and federal courts sitting in diversity are to apply state rules 
announced while litigation is pending, how can a federal court uphold a state 
retroactivity rule that might, in particular circumstances, require prospectiv-
ity? In that respect, the eagerness in Vandenbark to adhere to Erie has pro-
duced a possibility of distorting the doctrine Erie meant to establish.240 
The solution has been to take Vandenbark at somewhat less than face 
value, grafting onto it the larger Erie principle that federal courts should do 
what state courts would do in the same situation. .Downs v. J. M. Huber 
Corp. 241 demonstrated the success of that approach . .Downs turned upon the 
duty an owner of property owed to a business invitee. The trial court had 
applied the existing state rule that an owner had no duty to warn or protect 
invitees against obvious dangers of which the invitee should have been aware. 
While the case was pending on appeal, however, the state supreme court 
235. Assuming that some of the mixtures of the two analyses involved more than harmless 
error, are there now persons in prisons who can make collateral attacks upon the retroactivity 
decisions in their cases? Are they required to have preserved the issue with objections- that is, 
should they have more clearly understood than almost all the federal courts that Chevron and 
Linkleller/Stoval/ were different? See supra notes 26-30, 81-85 and accompanying text. 
236. 311 u.s. 538 (1941). 
237. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). While controlled by Erie, the rule of 
Vandenbark is also an outgrowth of the doctrine of United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 103 (1801). 311 U.S. at 541-42. 
238. 311 U.S. at 543. . 
239. See, e.g., Baker v. Outboard Marine Corp., 595 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1979); Samuels v. Doc· 
tors Hosp., Inc., 588 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1979). In many cases the principle of Vandenbark is 
applied without a reference to the Supreme Court case. Ettinger v. Central Penn Nat'l Bank, 634 
F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980); Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1973); Avila v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 481 F. Supp. 431 (C.D. Cal. 1979), qff'd, 651 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Vandenbark has even been cited in nondiversity cases for the "settled rule" of automatic retroac· 
tivity when the law changes before a decision is final. Robinson v. Heilman, 563 F.2d 1304, 1307 
(9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); C. Blake McDowell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 71 (1978). 
240. Nelson v. Brunswick Corp., 503 F.2d 376,381-82 n.l2 (9th Cir. 1974);see generally lA pt. 
2 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 0.307(3] (2d 
ed. 1982 & Cum. Supp. 1982-83). 
241. 580 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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changed the duty to one of reasonable care.242 The panel of the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged its discomfort with the apparent 
requirement in Vandenbark for retroactivity even in circumstances in which 
the state might have preferred a different result. With that consideration in 
mind, the court made a more searching examination of the retroactivity issue 
than Vandenbark required. Noting that the state supreme court had typically 
been quite explicit when it displayed a preference for prospectivity, the court 
commented that in this instance no preference had been expressed in the state 
court.243 Moreover, the law-changing decision had been foreshadowed by two 
earlier state decisions. The Fifth Circuit in Downs, therefore, made the state 
decision retroactive, as Vandenbark would have, but the court had traveled a 
more circuitous route than Vandenbark directs.244 That apparent quirk in 
Vandenbark resolved, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit does not seem 
to have encountered further difficulty wi~ the rule in diversity cases.245 
2. Retroactivity for Agency Matters 
Retroactivity for agency policies or practice is also covered by a special 
retroactivity rule: 
Appellate courts ordinarily apply the law in effect at the time of the 
appellate decision, see Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711 
. . . . However, a court reviewing an agency decision following an 
intervening change of policy by the agency should remand to permit 
the agency to decide in the first instance whether giving the change 
retrospective effect will best effectuate the policies underlying the 
agency's governing act.246 
The direction is not free from ambiguity, establishing as it does only one fac-
tor-the purpose factor of Linkletter and Chevron-that the agency presuma-
bly must consider before reaching its decision. Also left uncertain is the 
242. Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978). Note that when this circum-
stance arises in cases involving federal questions, nearly automatic retroactivity is achieved. See 
supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text; see also i'!fra notes 251-65 and accompanying text. 
243. 580 F.2d at 796. 
244. 580 F.2d at 796-97. 
245. In Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., Am. Home Prods., 594 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1979), de-
cided a year after Downs, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit used its modified 
Vandenbark approach without a mention of the original problem: 
Appellant's third challenge to the employment of this statute as a defense centers around 
a decision by the Florida Supreme Court that declared the applicable statute unconstitu-
tional subsequent to the trial below. Linville v. State o/ Florida, 359 So.2d 450 (Fla. 
1978). The court in Linville failed to address the issue of retroactive application of their 
decision. While this may be some evidence of a reluctance to so apply its decision, the 
court's silence on this issue is certainly not conclusive evidence of a decision not to apply 
its decision retroactively. However, without any direct evidence that the court intended 
to apply its decision retroactively, we decline to apply Linville to the instant case. 
/d. at 1057. Of some additional interest is the failure of the Fifth Circuit to give the law-changing 
decision the presumption of retroactivity that would be characteristic even of the Linklet-
ter/Stovall or Chevron lines. 
246. NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Loca1347, 417 U.S. 1, 10 n.lO (1974). See supra 
note 77. 
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standard reviewing courts are to use when, after "the first instance," the 
agency's retroactivity decision arrives in the judicial arena on appeal. 
In NLRJJ v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc .,247 the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit faced precisely those questions. In the course of adjudicating 
a labor dispute, the Board had applied retroactively a new policy granting 
back pay to an unlawfully discharged striking employee. Prior to the Board's 
change of policy, it had for thirty years refused back pay to unlawfully dis-
charged striking employees, granting it only to those who were unlawfully dis-
charged while working.248 When the Board's decision· on retroactivity came 
before the court, it used the three-factor appoach of Chevron when it affirmed 
the agency analysis. Although the language the court used does not clarify the 
matter entirely, it appears that the panel was unaware of the inconsistency in 
reviewing a one-factor agency retroactivity analysis with the more elaborate 
mechanism of Chevron: 
In the instant case, the matter seems settled for us because the new 
rule was not an unforeshadowed departure from the Board's previ-
ously existing practice, and the Board has sufficiently demonstrated a 
basis for its view that retroactive application will further rather than 
retard the operation of the rule. In addition, retroactive application 
will not create substantial injustice or undue hardship for either 
party. The Board finds no valid reason for distinguishing between 
the status of an unlawfully discharged striker and of an unlawfully 
discharged working employee. Contrary to the Company's claim, 
the rule enforced here does not provide a windfall to striking em-
ployees but merely places the burden of undoing the wrong on the 
wrongdoer, where it seems properly to belong.249 
The Board appeared to have made the determination of the purpose factor, 
while the assessment of the other two Chevron factors apparently was left to 
the court. Assuming that the court was as able as the Board to make a deter-
mination upon the novelty rule, it is difficult to understand how the judicial 
panel would normally be as well equipped as the Board to assess the effect 
factor of Chevron. Although the opinion in Lyon & Ryan Ford is unquestion-
ably thoughtful, and the decision appears to be correct, the approach used-
which may be exactly the one the Supreme Court mandated-raises more ap-
prehensions than it resolves.250 At the very least, it creates a possibility that 
an agency will carefully and correctly weigh the purpose factor-the sole fac-
tor assigned to it-only to be overturned upon judicial review when the court 
examines the other two factors. A more purposeless activity can hardly be 
imagined. 
247. 647 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). 
248. Id. at 755. 
249. Id. at 757. 
250. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had a much easier task in NLRB v. Cam· 
bridge Wire Cloth Co., 622 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1980), in which it merely had to remand a matter 
to the Board so that the agency could make the initial retroactivity analysis. 
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3. Schooner Peggy 
As we have seen, for civil cases on direct appeal, the Supreme Court has 
continued to respect the ancient rule of Schooner Peggy, which commands that 
in such litigation intervening changes of law will be applied retroactively.251 
The rule is subject to exceptions only when it will produce "manifest injus-
tice,"252 a term that remains undefined by the Court. For the most part, fed-
eral courts have experienced no difficulty in distinguishing the body of cases 
subject to Schooner Peggy from those that fall under Linkletter/Stova/1 or 
Chevron, and the result has been decisions that are, if nothing else, straightfor-
ward and easily reached.253 . 
A particularly interesting demonstration of the rigor with which this rule 
operates arose in a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
Zichy v. Ci~y of Philadelphia254 was a class action alleging sex discrimination 
in the city's approach to maternity leave for female employees. The district 
court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, but while the case was pending 
on appeal the Supreme Court held that an employer's disability plan was not 
unlawful simply because it did not include pregnancy benefits.255 Based upon 
the new rule of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed and remanded the case so the district court could determine whether 
an amended complaint would permit plaintiffs case to continue on other 
grounds. On remand the lower court denied a motion to amend, and plaintiffs 
appealed. 
Once again, however, a Supreme Court decision intervened, this time by 
a holding that an employer's policy forcing female employees who take mater-
nity leave to lose accumulated seniority constitutes unlawful sex discrimina-
tion. 256 Addressing the argument that the second Supreme Court decision 
could not be permitted to overturn the law of the case developed during the 
251. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). See also supra notes 68-
79 and accompanying text. 
252. Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 716 (1974). See supra note 73. 
253. See, e.g., Women's Health Serv., Inc. v. Maher, 636 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1980); Eastern Scien-
tific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 833 
(1978); Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807 (lOth Cir. 1977); California v. 
Italian Motorship Ilice, 534 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1976); Kinsman Marine Transit Co. v. Great Lakes 
Towing Co., 532 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). The foregoing cases all involve interven-
ing judicial lawmaking that was applied retroactively to cases on direct appeal, but the rule also 
applies to intervening statutory changes as well. Scarboro v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 619 F.2d 621 
(6th Cir.) (per curiam) (congressional amendment to Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 
Indeed, Schooner Peggy itself involved an intervening change of law through ratification of a 
treaty. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that a party's reliance upon the decision 
of the district court that has been appealed does not trigger an exception based upon "manifest 
injustice" to a Schooner Peggy result. McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 569 F.2d 276, 278 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (en bane) (per curiam) (neither law nor equity compels such an exception), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 1014 (1980). No case was identified in which the "manifest injustice" exception was 
applied. 
254. 590 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1979). 
255. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
256. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). 
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first appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit simply opted for the 
Schooner Peggy rule: 
This court has a duty to apply a supervening rule of law despite its 
prior decisions to the contrary when the new legal rule is valid and 
applicable to the issues of the case .... Here, the Supreme Court's 
decision . . . intervened between the first time the case was before us 
and this appeal. Therefore we are not bound by our prior holding.257 
Even the law-of-the-case doctrine,258 normally triumphant, had to change 
course to let the Schooner Peggy pass. 
As settled as the practice is of retroactively applying law-changing deci-
sions to civil cases on direct appeal, the appellate courts have been careful not 
to use the Schooner Peggy doctine outside the precise confines of the particular 
situation to which it applie~ivil cases on appeal. That practice has been 
followed even when the facts of a case suggest that some expansion of the 
scope of Schooner Peggy would be consistent with the" logic of the rule. In 
Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,259 the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit refused just such an opportunity to use the doctrine. Plaintiffs in Cates 
alleged racial discrimination. They initially survived a motion to dismiss their 
claim as time-barred because the district court reasoned that filing a Title VII 
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission also tolled 
the statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The 
Supreme Court then held that filing a complaint with the Commission does 
not toll a statute oflimitations applicable to section 1981,260 and the trial court 
thereupon dismissed the complaint. On direct appeal, plaintiffs cited Chevron 
as a basis for applying prospectively the law-changing decision of the Supreme 
Court. 
If ever a circumstance existed in which the rule of Schooner Peggy might 
appropriately be expanded beyond its current boundary, Cates would seem to 
present that circumstance. The lower court was, after all, still in a pretrial 
posture when the Supreme Court made its decision, so applying the new rule 
would not significantly disrupt the existing course of litigation any more than 
it would had Cates already gone through trial and was on direct appeal-in 
fact, it would represent a smaller disruption. Although the Second Circuit 
concluded that the new Supreme Court rule should apply retroactively, it did 
so without reference to any of the cases in the Schooner Peggy line. Instead, 
the appellate court simply held that the plaintiffs in Cates had delayed in as-
serting their rights and therefore did not have a good prospectivity plea under 
Chevron .261 Cates and Zichy together suggest that the Schooner Peggy doc-
trine remains vigorous and flourishing, but only when it puts its roots into the 
very special soil of civil cases on direct appeal. 
257. 590 F.2d at 508. 
258. See 1B J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 0.404 (2d ed. 1982 & 
Cum. Supp. 1982-83). 
259. 561 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1977). 
260. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). 
261. 561 F.2d at 1073-74. 
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One reason why use of Schooner Peggy has not expanded becomes clearer 
in light of a few cases in which it was not used, especially upon consideration 
of the results that might have occurred had the doctrine been applied. In Kelly 
v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Boartf262 black schoolteachers who had 
been laid off in a school system reorganization sued to recover their jobs, alleg-
ing that the dismissal process was tainted by racial bias and otherwise pro-
vided inadequate due process protections. Before the case reached appeal, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided another matter in which it es-
tablished certain procedural requirements for such layoffs. That rule, how-
ever, was not made applicable to Kelly: 
The plaintiffs were laid off by the letter dated August 8, 1969. That 
was before Singleton [v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 
419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1979)] was decided. The defendants could 
not anticipate Singleton's subsequent holding that the criteria used in 
selecting the teacher to be laid off "shall be available for public in-
spection." Clearly, that part of Singleton is not retroactive.263 
If the plaintiffs had lost at trial and had been on appeal at the time Single-
ton was decided, Schooner Peggy would have compelled a reversal, irrespec-
tive of what the defendants could have anticipated at the time of the layoffs. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expressed similar sentiments 
in an analogous situation. In Cle- Ware Industries v. Sokolsky264 that circuit 
strongly disapproved a practice in bankruptcy matters of compensating two 
different attorneys for their respective work as counsel for the debtor and 
counsel for the debtor-in-possession. Arguably the inapproptiateness of drain-
ing two different fees from "one and the same person" should have been mani-
fest to all concerned, but the court nevertheless made its decision prospective 
only: 
In the present case . . . we are confronted by a situation where an 
able and experienced Bankruptcy Judge has followed this practice in 
accordance with previously established precedent in his District at a 
time when there was no precedent to the contrary in this Circuit. 
Two sets of attorneys have devoted considerable time and effort in 
this Chapter XI proceeding which resulted in the confirmation of a 
Plan of Arrangement continuing the economic life of Cle-W are and 
its subsidiaries. The Bankruptcy Judge avoided the considerable ex-
penses of a receivership, yet kept the debtor corporations functioning 
as a continuing enterprise. 
Appellants contend that no fee should be allowed to counsel for 
the debtor. This appears to be a question of first impression in this 
Circuit and we apply today's rule only prospectively. We are unwill-
ing to make this rule applicable in the present case because of the 
obvious inequities that would result.265 
262. 517 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975). 
263. Id. at 199. 
264. 493 F.2d 863 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 829 (1974). 
265. Id. at 871. 
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Nevertheless, if the case had been on appeal when a similar law-changing de-
cision came down in an unrelated case, the "obvious inequities" would not 
have mattered at all. 
In both Kelly and Cle- Ware the predicament retroactivity would have 
created, and the perceived unfairness it would involve created the degree of 
appellate sympathy necessary to produce holdings of prospectivity. If those 
courts were correct in their estimate of the hardships a rigid rule of automatic 
retroactivity would impose, we are left to wonder why it is that automatic 
retroactivity for civil cases which happen to have reached the appellate stage 
of litigation is nonetheless acceptable. 
4. Retroactivity for Jurisdictional Matters 
Anyone familiar with retroactivity analysis who reads the recent Supreme 
Court opinions in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjortf266 and Northern Pipe-
. line Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 267 may well experience an 
overwhelming sense of deja vu. A decade ago the Court seemed to present a 
bold requirement for retroactivity in law-changing cases that reduced the ju-
risdiction of a court,268 only to draw back from that position in a subsequent 
case.269 Then in 1981 the Court produced Risjord: "A court lacks discretion 
to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction, and thus, 
by definition, a jurisdictional ruling may never be made prospective only."270 
"Never" proved to be a very short time. In June 1982 the Court held that 
bankruptcy judges could not hear bankruptcy cases. In the words of the 
Court, ''the broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts contained in 
§ 24l(a) [of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978] is unconstitutiona1."271 The Court 
also held, without any reference to Risjord, that "our decision today shall ap-
ply only prospectively."272 
The law in this area of retroactivity analysis has therefore undergone sig-
nificant disruption recently, and it is difficult to determine which twist in the 
road will be the last. The experience of the lower courts in the last ten years, 
however, may be of value, because the decisions of the Supreme Court during 
the early 1970s seem also to be characterized by some of the confusion present 
in Risjord and Northern Pipeline. There is, however, an important difference 
between the decisions of the early 1970s and the more recent opinions. The 
difference arises from some of the language used in the earlier cases. Although 
United States v. United Stales Coin & Currency273 and Robinson v. Neif274 
266. 449 u.s. 368 (1981). 
267. 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). 
268. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973); United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 
401 U.S. 715 (1971). See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text. 
269. Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973). See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
270. 449 U.S. at 379. 
271. Northern Pipeline, 102 S. Ct. at 2880. 
272. Id. 
273. 401 u.s. 715 (1971). 
274. 409 u.s. 505 (1973). 
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ultimately came to be seen as cases whose results are based upon jurisdictional 
considerations,275 their emphasis upon the importance of the constitutional 
rights at issue-self-incrimination in United States Coin and double jeopardy 
inRoblitson-led some courts to believe that the decisions stood for retroactiv-
ity in cases involving fundamental, nonprocedural rights. In those cases the 
jurisdictional element in the Supreme Court decisions received correspond-
ingly less weight. 
The distortion that could thereby result was exemplified by an opinion 
from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Radcltffv. Anderson 216 ad-
dressed the retroactivity of a decision striking down a state statute that dis-
criminated between the sexes by setting different maximum ages at which 
females and males could claim the benefit of juvenile court processes.277 The 
law-changing case itself had directed that it would not apply retroactively,278 
and the Radc/tff panel acknowledged that the old law had not damaged the 
accuracy or fairness of trial processes. Considered on those facts alone it 
might appear that the decision would be in favor of prospectivity, but in fact 
the court reached the opposite conclusion: "We believe that the principles of 
'basic fairness' mentioned in Robinson and 'essential justice' mentioned in 
Gosa require that the [law-changing] decision be applied retroactively."279 
Other courts successfully hurdled the fundamental-rights language, only 
275. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2587-88 (1982). 
276. 509 F.2d 1093 (lOth Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 939 (1975). 
277. Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (lOth Cir. 1972). 
278. I d. at 20. No effort was made in this investigation to compile statistics on the number or 
percentage of cases in which both the law-changing decision and the retroactivity decision were 
announced at the same time. The impression gathered, however, is that only a minority of law-
changing cases also contain a decision on the retroactivity issue. 
279. 509 F.2d at 1096. Another case in which the fundamental-right language distorted the 
reasoning and result in a lower court is Baynor v. Warden, 391 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Md. 1975). The 
district court had to rule upon the retroactivity of a Supreme Court decision holding that time 
served on a vacated conviction had to be credited to the sentence handed down after a second 
trial: 
The new rule is clearly not procedural, having nothing to do with the use of evidence or 
with a particular mode of trial. It is rather a rule of substantive, fundamental constitu-
tional law made mandatory on the states through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Hence, it is presumptively retroactive. 
Id. at 1253-54. Cf. Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835, 839 (4th Cir. 1979) (''the guarantee against 
double jeopardy is 'significantly different' from other new procedural guarantees which are gener-
ally non-retroactive"). Even in a particularly sophisticated analysis a court was unable to divorce 
itself completely from the fundamental right thesis. See United States ex rei. Williams v. Preiser, 
360 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (abortionist convicted in 1966 sought release by pleading retro-
active application of the famous abortion rights case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. ll3 (1973}), qfjd, 
497 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1974): 
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court established that a statute such as section 1050 of 
former New York Penal Law is violative of the Due Process clause of tlte fourteenth 
amendment. The Supreme Court did not expressly rule on the retrospectivity ofits abor-
tion decisions, but recent pronouncements by the Court as to this aspect of its constitu-
tional adjudications of criminal cases strongly support the notion that a judicial decision 
as to a substantive freedom should be afforded retrospective effect. 
360 F. Supp. at 668 (citing, inter alia, Robinson v. Neil). The court presented a thoughtful ap-
proach, certainly, but one which would have been better founded if it rested upon the inability of 
a court to punish a person for protected activity, rather than upon the fundamentality of the right 
protecting that activity. 
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to falter upon the split between United States Coin/ Robinson and Gosa. In 
United States v. Bodey280 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit abjured 
the use of a Linkletter/Chevron281 analysis because the principle involved in 
the law-changing decision was a matter of double jeopardy, and therefore was 
controlled by Robinson.282 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, by 
contrast, took its hint from Gosa when it dealt with the retroactivity of a deci-
sion holding unlawful the procedure by which certain court martials had been 
convened.283 The result, per Gosa, was the application of the Linklet-
ter/Stovall analysis and a decision in favor of prospectivity.284 
Notwithstanding the confusion, some retroactivity analyses in the last 
decade have been quite thoughtful.285 For that reason, the area cannot simply 
be dismissed as a quagmire, even though recent Supreme Court decisions offer 
little evidence of clarification. 
5. United States v. Peltier: The Retroactivity Analysis That Never Was 
In 1975 the Supreme Court decided United States v. Peltier.286 The deci-
sion made prospective an earlier holding that a warrantless automobile search 
by federal Border Patrol agents acting without probable cause at a substantial 
distance from the national border violated the fourth amendment.287 The de-
cision could have been fairly routine. Indeed, as Justice Rehnquist's majority 
opinion pointed out, the practice of the Court typically had been to make deci-
280. 607 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1979). 
281. It was the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that linked those two approaches. See 
supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
282. ''These cases [Chevron andLink/eller] were concerned with the applicability of new rules 
to parties who had relied on the old rules to their disadvantage. The Supreme Court specifically 
distinguished the Linkleller line of cases in a later double jeopardy decision." 607 F.2d at 268 
(citing Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973)). 
283. The law-changing case was United States v. Greenwell, 19 C.M.A. 460 (1970). 
284. Brown v. United States, SOB F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1027 (1975). 
285. Such cases include Blackburn v. Cross, 510 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1975). The petitioner in 
Blackburn sought to overturn his conviction because at trial the prosecution used testimony of a 
victim of an earlier, similar crime - notwithstanding earlier acquittal of defendant on that 
charge. Subsequent to the conviction, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a state 
was collaterally estopped from relitigating for any purpose an issue determined in a prior prosecu-
tion of the same defendant. Although the law-changing case was grounded in double jeopardy 
principles, the court did not mechanically conclude that the case was synonymous with Robinson. 
Instead, the court said the law-changing case was: 
rooted in the principle of double jeopardy, [but] its operation merely precludes the intro-
duction of certain disfavored evidence. In light of the Robinson rationale it would be 
unreasonable for us to conclude that the Supreme Court in Robinson was addressing 
itself to the exclusion of evidence of prior crimes and, hence, intended Robinson to apply 
to procedural guarantees based upon the principle of double jeopardy. We therefore 
prefer to rest our decision upon the Linkleller line of cases. 
Id. at 1017. 
Another case, Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1981), considered whether the 
rule of retroactivity for jurisdictional issues applied to in personam jurisdiction as well as subject 
matter jurisdiction. Id. at 798 n.4. Holzsager was decided in the period between Ri.rjord and 
Northern Pipeline, so it is difficult to determine how the addition of Northern Pipeline affects the 
reasoning of Ho/zsager. 
286. 422 u.s. 531 (1975). 
287. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
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sions on the exclusionary rule prospective.288 Peltier, however, proved to be 
different, and that difference caused lower courts more than a little tribulation 
for seven years. 
When Peltier had been before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
that court had opted for retroactivity on the ground that the substantive law at 
issue had not altered sufficiently to justify prospectivity.289 The dissenters, in 
tum, argued that the law-changing case erased a line of circuit court decisions 
as well as existing statutes and regulations . approving the warrantless 
search.290 The Supreme Court, however, gave little emphasis to the dispute 
over whether the law had changed sufficiently and concentrated instead upon 
the nature of the exclusionary rule and its particular requirements in the con-
text of retroactivity.291 The result was an analysis that departed somewhat 
from the standardLinkletter/Stovall approach. Although the majority opinion 
professed adherence to Linkletter ,292 Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in Peltier 
was rather special: 
Whether or not the exclusionary rule should be applied to the roving 
border patrol search conducted in this case, then, depends on 
whether considerations of either judicial integrity or deterrence of 
Fourth Amendment violations are sufficiently weighty to require that 
the evidence obtained by the Border Patrol in this case be 
excluded.293 
In a nutshell that passage summarized the three foundations of the majority's 
holding: (1) the presence of a fourth amendment exclusionary rule problem; 
(2) the integrity of the judicial process; and (3) the prospect that unlawful po-
lice behavior might be deterred. Notably absent, as Justice Brennan's dissent 
pointed out, was any recognition of a requirement that the decision at issue be 
something substantially new before a claim of prospectivity could be in-
voked.294 Justice Brennan also accused the majority of establishing a separate 
prospectivity rule applicable only to the fourth amendment and of "stand[ing] 
the Linkletter holding on its head by creating a class of cases in which nonret-
roactivity is the rule and not, as heretofore, the exception."295 
Given the language used by both majority and minority, it would have 
been surprising if some lower courts had not concluded that Peltier established 
a special rule of retroactivity analysis for exclusionary-rule cases. A number 
of circuits did precisely that. Perhaps the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit stated that position most baldly: 
We do not reach the question of whether or not a change in search 
and seizure law has occurred. The Supreme Court has held that 
288. 422 U.S. at 535. 
289. 500 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1974). 
290. /d. 
291. 422 U.S. at 535-39. 
292. /d. at 538. 
293. /d. at 539. 
294. /d. at 544-49. 
295. /d. at 550. 
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changes in the law of search and seizure are not retroactive where 
evidence seized by authorities was in good faith compliance with 
then existing constitutional norms. 296 
Other courts acted as though Peltier had changed nothing,297 a view the 
Supreme Court would ultimately ratify in United States v. Johnson .298 
In Johnson, however, the majority was unable to avoid dissembling. Jus-
tice Blackmun, who had joined the majority inPeltier, wrote for a majority in 
Johnson that included the only two Peltier dissenters remaining on the Court, 
Justices Brennan and Marshall. The Johnson majority adopted its own special 
rule for fourth amendment cases on direct appeal. Unlike Peltier, however, 
which had also been a case on direct appeal,299 the new rule was one of retro-
activity.300 Moreover, and also with the assent of the two justices who had 
dissented in Peltier, the five-justice majority in Johnson explained that far 
from being a new approach, ''Peltier resembles several earlier decisions that 
held 'new' Fourth Amendment doctrine nonretroactive, not on the ground that 
all Fourth Amendment rulings apply only prospectively, but because the par-
ticular decisions being applied 'so change[d] the law that prospectivity [was] 
296. United States v. Kranzthor, 614 F.2d 981, 982 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (citing Peltier). 
Accord Savina Home Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1363 (lOth Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Escalante, 554 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 862 (1977); United 
States v. Martinez, 526 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane); cf. United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 
803 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane) ("special retroactivity doctrines affecting the exclusionary rule stated 
in United Stales v. Peltier" are irrelevant in retroactivity case involving law of entrapment), cerl. 
denied sub nom. Robles v. United States, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977). 
297. Some cases reject the distinction explicitly, while others do so simply by using the stan-
dard Linkleller or Chevron doctrine in the course of an analysis. An example of the former is 
United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1163 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 
2157 (1982): 
It is true that the Court in Peltier did not set out this [novel] consideration as a separate 
inquiry, directing the courts instead to ask whether the police officer knew or should 
have known that his conduct was in accordance with the law. We believe, however, that 
the former inquiry is subsumed in the latter. If a decision develops no new law, then the 
police officer-who is charged with knowledge of the old law-should have known, and 
acted in a manner consistent with, the core doctrine. 
See also United States v. Schleis: "While the meaning of the Court's language is not entirely clear, 
we do not read United States v. Peltier . . • as reflecting a new approach that an exclusionary rule 
would only be applied in cases of bad faith violations of the Fourth Amendment." 582 F.2d 1166, 
1174 n.7 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane). 
Cases implicitly treating Peltier as merely a part of the Linkleller/Stovallline include United 
States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219 (2d Cir.), (citing LinkletJer and Peltier), cerl. denied sub nom. 
Crespo v. United States, 442 U.S. 919 (1979); United States v. Walker, 569 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.) 
(same), cerl. denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978); United States v. Lenardo, 420 F. Supp. 1148 (D.N.J. 
1976) (same). The apparent inconsistency in the view of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in Walker, United States v. Escalante, 554 F.2d 970 (9th Cir), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 862 
(1977), and United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied sub nom. Robles v. 
United States, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977), is explained because the court bas taken something of a 
unique view of Peltier, viewing it on the one hand as different and special to the exclusionary rule, 
but on the other hand as maintaining the requirement that there be a significant change in the law 
before prospectivity may be granted. For the retention of the novelty requirement, see Escalante, 
554 F.2d at 973, and Hart, 546 F.2d at 803. For those readers unsatisfied with this explanation, it 
may be of interest that two of the judges who decided Walker sat on the en bane decisions in 
Escalante and Hart. Walker does not cite either of the earlier cases. 
298. 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2591-94 (1982). 
299. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 552 n.lO (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
300. 102 S. Ct. at 2594. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
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arguably the proper course.' "301 Eight years ago Peltier presented itself as a 
new, special-purpose retroactivity analysis, and a number of lower courts took 
the decision at its word. More recently, those courts learned that for reasons 
related only tangentially to retroactivity, the opinion in Peltier is now held not 
to mean what it apparently said. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Conclusions about the state of retroactivity analysis in the federal courts 
can proceed along a number of lines, but some considerations will emerge as 
crucial regardless of the approach selected. Certainly it is clear that current 
retroactivity doctrines are complex and exist in uneasy harmony. Like an 
emulsion, the various approaches seem suspended in one configuration only 
until even a minor change occurs; then the entire structure may shift substan-
tially before resting in some new, perhaps unforeseen, posture. That circum-
stance, of course, only highlights the impressive dedication circuit and district 
court judges have brought to their responsibility to follow the twisting, diverg-
ing, interlocking, and changing precedent the Supreme Court has established. 
That is not to say, of course, that lower courts are immune from error, or even 
outright carelessness. A sufficient number of cases demonstrates the con-
trary.302 But for the most part, a reasonable conclusion would be that lower 
court judges have worked hard at their assigned task. 
301. /d. at 2592 (quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 659 (1971); alterations by 
Court). Indeed, Justice Blackmun reasoned that to adopt the other view of Peltier would make all 
exclusionary rule decisions prospective. /d. at 2593. That, of course, may have been precisely 
what Justice Rehnquist had in mind when he fashioned the majority opinion in Peltier. 
· 302. For example, in 1972, six months after the decision of the Supreme Court in Chevron, a 
three-judge district court in Illinois decided a class action for retroactive money payments to per-
sons whom the state had not previously paid. The refusal of the state to pay had meanwhile been 
reversed as unconstitutional. When the state sought to useLinkletter/Stovall to argue for prospec-
tivity, the court held that Linkletter and its progeny had developed in the context of criminal cases 
not strictly applicable to civil matters. Moreover, citing a 1968 case from the Linkletter line, the 
district court opined that the Supreme Court did not anticipate application of the three-tiered 
retroactivity analysis to civil cases. Then the court concluded that retroactivity was more appro-
priate because, inter alia, the right to receive the money had "vested" in the plaintiffs. Alexander 
v. Weaver, 345 F. Supp. 666, 671 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded on 
other grounds, 412 U.S. 914 (1973). A year later, another district court, adjudicating a civil suit for 
monetary damages and an injunction in which retroactivity was an issue, wrote, "We note that all 
of the recent United States Supreme Court opinions dealing with the retroactivity problem have 
involved criminal procedures, not civil suits for monetary compensation and equitable relief." 
United States ex rel Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 950 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Interestingly, both of 
the foregoing opinions were otherwise well reasoned. 
Other courts, from time to time, appear to have felt free to develop their O'\\n rules of retroac-
tivity. In United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 
(1979), for example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached its own special retroactiv-
ity result. The issue in James was the standard to be followed in determining the admissibility at 
trial of out-of-court statements by alleged coconspirators. The court used this case to overrule the 
prevailing test, but casually made its new rule effective only "in trials commencing after 30 days 
from the date of this opinion." /d. at 583. The court indulged in no further discussion of retroac-
tivity, leaving us to ponder how much impression the Supreme Court made when it restated in 
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 2323 (1977), its rule that in matters in which the purpose 
of a new decision goes substantially to more accurate determinations of truth at trial, retroactivity 
is likely to be the result. See also National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1118, 1132 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (four relevant criteria to be used for retroactivity analysis--'~ustifiable reliance," 
purpose of new rule, "degree of finality of plaintiffs transaction," and "element of surprise"). 
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It would seem to follow that blame for whatever shortcomings may exist 
. should properly be placed on the Supreme Court. In several important ways it 
is true that much of the confusion, both current and over the preceeding dec-
ade, is the product of several weaknesses in the approach of the Supreme 
Court to retroactivity. The Court has, for example, failed to provide any rea-
sonable justification for its distinction between cases subject to Schooner 
Peggy and those governed by Chevron. It is easy to predict the result in a 
Schooner Peggy situation, and almost as easy to determine when the situation 
arises, but there has yet to be a valid explanation of the logic or reason why 
that rule and Chevron should coexist. 
That odd amalgam of history and more recent jurisprudential thought 
aside, retroactivity analysis also shows an unfortunate side to the manner in 
which the Supreme Court undertakes to make rules. Some years ago Justice 
Harlan candidly acknowledged that he had viewed prospectivity less as a prin-
cipled doctrine to be developed than as an opportunity to restrict the influence 
of substantive decisions with which he disagreed.303 Justice Harlan subse-
quently abjured that approach,304 but the subplot concerning retroactivity in 
exclusionary rule matters that may recently have presented itself 305 gives rise 
to a suspicion that something like Justice Harlan's earlier practice is still in 
evidence among the various factions on the Court. 
Perhaps most disturbing of all has been the occasional quiet disregard by 
the Court of its own precedent, or even of its obligation to establish precedent. 
The former problem arose most recently in the conflict between the retroactiv-
ity approaches of Risjord and Northern Pipeline.306 Perhaps it is wrong to 
term the inconsistency a conflict, for in Northern Pipeline the Court simply 
ignored altogether the clear principle upon which Risjord rested, presumably 
because in Northern Pipeline that principle would have led to unpalatable re-
sults. Such turnabouts are difficult enough for the lower courts, but it is more 
difficult still when the Supreme Court simply refuses to accept its rulemaking 
function-as it did in .Diedrich, in which Chief Justice Burger advised all who 
might be interested that tax decisions a~e "frequently" retroactive.307 
Criticism of flaws in Supreme Court doctrine must, in fairness, be tem-
pered by a recognition that developing rules for retroactivity analysis has 
never been an easy matter.308 Indeed, simplicity would have dictated that we 
settle for the old Blackstonian approach, which offered little but simplicity. 
But in the course of developing fairer, and necessarily more complex rules, the 
Supreme Cour.t may have made the job of the lower courts more difficult than 
303. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan 
noted, "I have in the past joined in some of those opinions which have, in so short a time, gener-
ated so many incompatible rules and inconsistent principles. I did so because I thought it impor-
tant to limit the impact of constitutional decisions which seemed to me profoundly unsound in 
principle." ld. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
304. ld. 
305. See supra notes 286-301 and accompanying text. 
306. See supra notes 50-60, 103-06 and accompanying text. 
307. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
308. See supra note I and accompanying text. 
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it needs to be. Throughout the nearly two decades since Linkletter, the Court 
has concentrated exclusively upon developing doctrine. It has, in words Jus-
tice Harlan used to describe another phenomenon, "fish[ed] one case from the 
stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitu-
tional standards,"309 without systematically examining how well the doctrine 
has worked in the lower courts. Left largely to their own devices, the lower 
courts have managed fairly well, but the absence of supervision permitted a 
growth of inconsistencies and apparent divergence from the basic doctrines of 
retroactivity-particularly in the area of Link!etter/Stoval! and Chevron-that 
has gone unchecked. It may be, as some have suggested, that the Supreme 
Court carries too heavy a workload to provide the sort of systematic supervi-
sion of the lower courts that is necessary.31° Certainly it is true, however, that 
without such supervision the goal of developing and applying coherent doc-
trines in such areas as retroactivity is unlikely to be reached. 
Retroactivity analysis also holds a lesson for those of us who, by virtue of 
employment or disposition, feel called upon to comment at length upon the 
workings of American courts. Writers addressing the state of progress of the 
federal courts in the area of retroactivity have concentrated primarily upon the 
development of doctrine at the Supreme Court leveP 11 The work produced 
has almost invariably been thoughtful and probably useful to the Supreme 
Court in its own efforts to produce doctrine.312 At the same time, however, 
commentators have often ignored the administrative underpinnings of the 
doctrine,313 and that is a loss. The fact is that of two tasks before the Supreme 
Court-development of doctrine and supervision of the application of doc-
trine in the lower courts-the second seems to have been less well performed. 
The reason for that shortcoming may in part lie in the inability of the Court to 
devote sufficient resources to its monitoring function. Whatever the cause, it is 
scholarly commentators who have the time and resources necessary to assist in 
identifying problems in application of rules, and it is to that more tedious but 
vital task314 that more effort should be directed. Doctrine remains, after all, 
only as good as its use. 
309. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
310. See, e.g., Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177 (1982). 
311. See supra note 14. 
312. It is difficult to read Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Fed-
eral Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962), and not believe that the author's careful work influenced the 
opinion of the Supreme Court in Linkletter. 
313. A notable exception is Beytagh, supra note 11, which puts forward the proposal that 
when the Supreme Court alters the law, it should hold a hearing to determine whether its new 
holding should apply retroactively. 
314. For any who question the importance of the job, a simple test would be in order. That 
test would begin with reading a fair sampling of the circuit and district court opinions in the area 
of retroactivity while ignoring any thought of Supreme Court doctrine. The second part of the test 
would be to construct retroactivity doctrines solely from the sampling of lower-court opinions. 
The third part of the test would be to determine what similarity, if any, lower-court doctrine had 
to contemporary Supreme Court doctrine. 
